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All published since 2002, A Van Jordan's Macnolia, Fanny Howe's Tis 
of Thee, and Harryette Mullen's Sleeping with the Dictionary share a 
fascination with formal experimentation and with the relationship between 
the textual and the performative; they also share a focus on segregation that 
would seem to imply that the problem of the color-line continues to afflict 
the twenty-first century—though the line is located, forty years after the Civil 
Rights Movement, not in law but in other places, including in certain 
performances of language.  My dissertation traces the resonance between, on 
the one hand, poetry’s ability to employ language that exceeds racist 
constraints, and on the other, its exhausting, deforming and reshaping of 
received literary constraints. Jordan’s, Howe’s and Mullen’s approaches to 
cross-genre abecedarian play insistently probe double consciousness and 
double voicedness—both as effects of and as potential tools against racism; 
my dissertation investigates the complex relationships in all three poets’ 
work among aesthetic stance, audience, the poet, the communities they 
represent, and those in which they intervene. 
My dissertation demonstrates how 21st-century poets are building 
new, hybrid poetics, radical both in form and content, by drawing upon 20th-
century traditions like Black Arts, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, Dada, and 
Oulipo without pledging orthodox allegiance to any single movement.  I 
argue that such collaged stylistic interventions lend new vigor to the literary 
project of interrogating American racial and economic formations, thereby 
opening new poetic avenues to the liberatory performance of repetition with 
a difference.  The dissertation takes as foundational Judith Butler’s claim that 
illicit speech “performatively produces a shift in the terms of legitimacy,” 
while it also addresses Robyn Weigman’s notion of “the spectacle” as “the 
culminating moment for the panoptic's reinforcement” in the Jim Crow 
social order.  To explore how these two insights inform practices of 
racialization in the present, I further draw on Saidiya Hartman’s ideas 
concerning stage, spectacle, and scene to describe a disjunction between 
Butler’s claims about the performativity of identity and the way 
contemporary poetry presents the lived experience of race.
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I spell even when they tell me to sit in the colored section . . . 
Before me, what I do had only been a prayer on a black girl’s tongue. 
What more can I ask for?  There’s a revolution wetting my lips. 
     A. Van Jordan, from MacNolia 
 
When I first encountered the phrase “the creaking of the word” in 
Nathaniel Mackey’s Discrepant Engagement, I misread it as “the creaking of 
the world.”  Dogon weavers in Mali, Mackey explains, rest looms upon a 
foundation they call “the creaking of the word” (19).  Both the phrase and 
my misreading of it are electric with implication:  the word/world (a world 
made of words, a word made world-sized) is a creaking contraption, a thing 
not quite solid, in danger of breaking.  It makes audible the pressures that 
human creativity puts upon it.  The Dogon phrase places this rickety, 
untrustworthy word at the foundation of material production—production 
specifically of fabric.  Fabric, too, bristles with connotation:  at its most 
literal and tangible, it is the material humans need to clothe—to protect—
our vulnerable bodies.  As a product of the spinning and weaving of fibers, 
fabric suggests interconnection and the complicated strength it produces.  At 
its grandest, fabric names the matrix underpinning everything:  the fabric of 
the universe, a phrase that suggests my misreading—world for word—wasn’t 
so far off.  And at the source of the universe’s fabric rests the creaky, 
creaking word. 
The word’s crash-test engineers, standing by to creak it to pieces, are 
of course—like Mackey himself—poets.  More people are writing and 
publishing poetry in the twenty-first century than at any previous time in 
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history.  People are writing traditional lyrics that would look familiar to 
Wordsworth; people are filling up the discipline’s happy middle and probing 
its unexplored edges, testing poetry’s boundaries with theatre, music, sound, 
visual and book arts. Via an array of new means of technological production, 
reproduction, and dissemination—both decidedly high-tech and high-tech in 
the service of low-tech—poets are returning to poetry’s aural, declamatory 
roots and introducing new kinetic, tactile, spatial, and nonsequential 
elements.  The rise of the Internet has presented decided advantages for 
poets, whose relation to the market—and thus to expensive traditional 
printing and distribution channels—is different from, less comfortable than, 
prose writers’.  That uneasy relationship has itself been both a disadvantage 
and an opportunity for turn-of-the-millennium poetry, which obsessively 
thematizes its anxieties about late capitalism and makes conceptual and 
formal leaps that defy genre (and thus the readerly expectations that make 
for reliable sales).  Meanwhile, queer and speech-act theories have shown our 
identities to be not fixed categories but creaky, processual performances; 
postcolonial studies of the world and of the U.S. have revealed racism as a 
basic constitutive fiber of the fabric of the capitalist world order.  Engaging 
word/world conjunctions as they play out in the twenty-first century, this 
dissertation investigates poets’ representations of Americans’ especially 
awkward relationships to concepts of performance and performativity when 
it comes to race.  
All published since 2002, A. Van Jordan's Macnolia, Fanny Howe's 
Tis of Thee, and Harryette Mullen's Sleeping with the Dictionary share a 
fascination with formal experimentation and with the relationship between 
the textual and the performative.  They also share a focus on segregation that 
highlights how W. E. B. DuBois’s problem of the color-line continues to 
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afflict the twenty-first century.  That line is located, forty years after the Civil 
Rights Movement, not so much in law as in other places, including—
crucially—in performances of language.  To employ language that exceeds 
racist constraints, these poets exhaust, deform, and reshape received literary 
constraints. Their approaches to cross-genre abecedarian play insistently 
probe double consciousness and double voicedness—both as effects of and 
as potential tools against racist and other forms of oppression, and as 
aesthetic aims in their own right.  All three books construct or reveal 
complex relationships among aesthetic stance, audience, and the poet.  The 
strategies they employ are in many ways typical of twenty-first century 
poetries that seek to carve space outside the first-person lyric tradition that 
dominates the poetic mainstream, but these strategies allow particular insight 
into the increasingly covert American language of race relations. 
Taken together, these books comprise an instructive sample of the 
new, hybrid poetics that contemporary U.S. poets are building.  This hybrid 
poetics—often radical both in form and content—preserves an index of 
20th-century traditions like Black Arts, L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, Dada, and 
Oulipo without pledging orthodox allegiance to any single movement.  
Rather, contemporary poets adopt a variety of stances in interactions with 
their predecessors, cycling rapidly between satire and parody on the one 
hand and allegiance and homage on the other to represent and explore the 
twenty-first century’s complex, ambivalent relationship to its multiple 
cultural inheritances.  Such richly woven stylistic interventions lend new 
vigor to the ongoing literary project of interrogating U.S. racial and 
economic formations, thereby opening new poetic avenues to the potentially 
liberatory performance of repetition with a difference—repetition with 
attention to repetition’s creaking.  That performance generates identity—and 
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that the recognition of identity formation’s performativity can deliver people 
from historical and institutional inscriptions of oppression—is a central tenet 
of twenty-first century critical discourse.  Interrogating such tenets is a basic 
function of poetry, part of its defamiliarizing project.  Yet, inevitably, poets 
often reinscribe the very pieties they hope to destabilize. 
 
Performing Identity, Performing Poetry:  Critical Frameworks 
Contemporary poetry inherits twentieth-century anxieties around the 
ossification and essentialization of identity.  Who speaks in the poem?  Is the 
lyric subject dead?  Can a poet claim to write in—to “find”—her “own 
authentic voice”?  As poets negotiate these aesthetic issues and others raised 
by the emergence of new sound- and image-recording media, they also 
confront pressing ethical and political questions.  What do concepts like 
equality, justice, and difference mean in our lives, and how should we value 
them?  How, for that matter, should our troubled world value poetry itself?  
This dissertation is particularly interested in how characteristic twenty-first 
century poetic strategies shed special light when the topic is race.  How 
should we interpret poets’ performances around this topic, and how should 
we interpret their representations of characters’ performances? 
In Excitable Speech, Judith Butler—drawing upon and departing 
from Bourdieu—describes speech acts’ dual capacities as “rite[s] of 
institution” and as “insurrectionary acts” (145). 
To account for such [insurrectionary] speech acts . . . 
one must understand language not as a static and closed system 
whose utterances are functionally secured in advance by . . . 
“social positions” . . . [or] prior contexts; . . . an utterance may 
gain its force precisely by virtue of the break with context that 
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it performs.  Such breaks with prior context or, indeed, with 
ordinary usage, are crucial to the political operation of the 
performative. 
 
Butler might as well be rehearsing L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry’s 
espousal of opaque and gestural writing or even Modernist, Objectivist, or 
Surrealist rationales for building poems up from allusion and assemblage.  
Poets who hope that radical aesthetic form will contribute to a radical 
political agenda in the world have long trusted that, in Butler’s words, illicit 
speech “performatively produces a shift in the terms of legitimacy” (147).  
We write from a hope, that is, that disrupting standard language patterns will 
allow new meanings to emerge, which will in turn create new contexts for 
speech and identity—will change the contours of what can be said, imagined, 
allowed.   
But what has a century of disruptive poetics accomplished in the 
political arena?  And are all bodies equally inscribed and performed as roles 
from which disruptive speech acts can liberate us?  Racial identity categories 
seem to be produced and sustained via fundamentally different kinds of 
performance than sexual identity categories—with different relationships to 
the biological body and the histories of its interpretation, as well as different 
aims and strategies.  Thus Judith Butler’s model of performative identity—
grounded as it is in feminist and queer theory—may reach a limit when it 
comes to describing how racial identity works.  Timothy Scheie’s exploration 
of performativity and agency in Aimé Césaire’s A Tempest provides some 
helpful starting points for conceptualizing the gap between Butlerian 
performativity and the project of speaking in a way that might subvert the 
implicit white supremacy our social institutions continue to enforce.   
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Scheie asserts about the performative that “despite its apparent 
liberatory potential,” it “does not easily serve the interests of an activist, 
counter-hegemonic agenda.”  For him, though a performative model of 
identity may “radically disturb oppressive identity categories,” it “also 
destabilizes the agent who seeks to subvert them” (20).   Of course, not all 
agents are looking for stability; identity’s instability is precisely what queer 
theory celebrates.  But as Harryette Mullen only half-jokingly points out, 
“It’s that white male subjectivity that needs to be put on hold . . . the rest of 
us . . . need our subjectivity” (Griffin 11).  Black people, traditionally denied 
agency and personhood in the United States and still systematically 
obstructed by notions of individual agency implicit in institutional and color-
blind racism, may find their political aims better served by a model of 
performative identity that reserves more agency to human beings, allowing 
observers to trace the power dynamics of particular performative situations 
and to hold individual and institutional actors accountable. 
In Scheie’s account, performers “who invoke the performative further 
relinquish the ability to recast identity at will, for it is precisely such 'wills' 
that performativity calls into question” (20).  But the “ability to recast 
identity at will” has been, in the covertly white supremacist U.S., specifically 
a white prerogative.  Can racially marked subjects be said to “relinquish” an 
ability U.S. racial formations have never granted them in the first place? 
Thus a gap opens between the lived experience of the sexual other, 
whose default starting position in a heteronormative social order is 
“closeted,” and the lived experience of the racial other, who, in the context 
of paranoid U.S. institutional racism, is always already “out.”  (Passing is of 
course possible, but it is usually deliberate, seldom the default.)  The sexual 
other’s stigmatized identity derives from a general social prohibition of 
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particular acts and practices; the racial other’s very body carries the stigma 
through which a prohibition may be enforced against engaging in acts and 
practices allowed to bodies that appear unmarked.  Seen another way, the 
sexual other’s transgressive identity might be said to arise from within, from 
a playful, perverse impulse (whether joyfully embraced or painfully 
disavowed) to embrace arbitrarily proscribed pleasures and desires (desires 
that may be created, at least in part, by their very proscription).  The racial 
other’s identity as other is, on the other hand, imposed from without, by 
institutions that—rather than merely include and exclude—declare some 
bodies inherently includable and others excludable.  Both the queer subject 
and the racially othered subject seek individual liberation in transgressing 
prohibitions and social justice in disrupting and remolding those 
prohibitions entirely, but the specific relationship among bodies, 
subjectivities, prohibitions and liberations is differently structured and draws 
on a different history of transgressive activism. 
Scheie attributes the limits of Butler’s model for his argument not to 
the fact that the identity categories he seeks to disrupt are racial ones, but to 
the fact that the text he is considering is itself a play.  “A dramatic 
performance in which the performer freely and knowingly assumes a role,” 
he writes, “represents precisely what the performative is not” (24).  As Butler 
writes in “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” her (lesbian) identity is, in 
contrast to the role an actor plays on stage, “not a performance from which 
I can take radical distance, for this is deep-seated play, psychically 
entrenched play” (125).  For Scheie, the contrast between theatrical roles and 
performative identity creation “emblematizes the theater's surreptitious 
reinforcement of an identity's claim to fixity rather than a revelation of 
identity's consitutive instability” (24).  Whereas Scheie sees this as a 
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limitation of the performative’s liberatory potential, I would argue in favor 
of continuing to consider racial identities as produced through performative 
processes—albeit ones whose descriptions are modified somewhat from 
Butler’s. 
The tradition of black writers and intellectuals’ describing black 
identity in terms of performance predates Judith Butler by at least a century.  
Paul Laurence Dunbar’s poem “We Wear the Mask” was published in 1896: 
We wear the mask that grins and lies, 
It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes,— 
This debt we pay to human guile; 
With torn and bleeding hearts we smile, 
And mouth with myriad subtleties. 
 
Why should the world be over-wise, 
In counting all our tears and sighs? 
Nay, let them only see us, while 
            We wear the mask. 
 
We smile, but, O great Christ, our cries 
To thee from tortured souls arise. 
We sing, but oh the clay is vile 
Beneath our feet, and long the mile; 
But let the world dream otherwise, 
            We wear the mask! 
 
Dunbar’s description of black life in the Jim Crow-era U.S. is specifically 
theatrical, supplied with song, smiles, and the mask.  Crucially, Dunbar 
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figures racial performance as performance from which we can take radical 
distance—in fact, that distance is for Dunbar the space of freedom, the 
space that protects the vulnerable black subject’s emotions not only from 
white intrusion, but also possibly from being overwhelmed by other black 
people’s pain: “the world” from which the speakers “hide our . . . torn and 
bleeding hearts” is easy to read as the white world, but nowhere in the poem 
does Dunbar represent black people removing the mask to share their 
“tortured souls” with one another.  The preexisting agent whom the masked 
performance shields is a radically private one, and one whose theatricality 
confers strength and power even while it fails to prevent secret heartache or 
to transform the world into a more equitable place.  
Butler urges us to understand “performativity not as the act by which 
a subject brings into being what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative 
power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and 
constrains” (Bodies That Matter 2)—that is, as deriving its identity-creating 
power not from a single instance of action, but from coherently (if not 
identically) repeated habits.  Dunbar’s mask figure instead points to an 
African-American tradition of contradictory habit—of bodily habits 
inconsistent with mental and emotional habits—of isolated actions tailored 
to specific audiences, and thus calculated not to add up to a coherent identity 
legible from outside.  This is not to say that black social identities lack 
coherence in all contexts—as Patricia McKee points out on the first page of 
American Anatomies, “The common identities of white Americans in works 
of James and Faulkner and the common identity of black Americans in 
works of Morrison depend alike on a consistency of public political behavior 
and individual consciousness.”  Rather, black subjects’ incoherent 
performances arise in interactions with oppressive white gazes.  In Dunbar’s 
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tradition, W.E.B. DuBois invokes theatrical performance when he writes in 
1903 of having felt that he had been “like [his schoolmates], mayhap, in 
heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil” (2) 
like a stage curtain.  The mask figure appears again from Frantz Fanon in 
1952.  This sense of racial identity as performed in the self-conscious, 
counterfactual sense of theatrical spectacle arises again and again in the 
poems this dissertation takes up.   
 Such theatrical performance implicitly raises issues of audience and 
viewership, issues that Robyn Wiegman takes up in American Anatomies.  
“Does ‘the fact of blackness,’” Weigman asks, “lie in the body and its 
epidermis or in the cultural training that quite literally teaches the eye not 
only how but what to see?” (22).  The implication here is that racial identity 
and difference arise as much from the viewer’s Butlerian performance of 
expectation and interpretation as from the viewed’s theatrical performance 
of himself in the world.  Wiegman is interested here in Foucauldian 
formations that trace the power relations between viewer and viewed in the 
disciplinary situations of the spectacle—that is, spectacular punishment—
and panoptic surveillance. Whereas Foucault describes a chronological shift 
in Europe from spectacular discipline in the seventeenth century to panoptic 
discipline beginning in the eighteenth, Wiegman points out that “the 
disciplinary power of race . . . must be read as implicated in both specular 
and panoptic regimes” working simultaneously and in tandem (39).  Paying 
attention to events as disparate and as far apart in time as public lynchings by 
anonymous, hooded white people and “the rising primacy of difference as 
commodity” in the post-civil rights era entertainment industry, reading 
through Wiegman helps to make sense of contemporary poets’ obsession 
with the ambivalent power wielded by and exerted upon black bodies on 
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stages and screens. 
 Finally, Saidiya Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection helps tease out the 
complexities of racial performance’s power ambivalences.  Hartman 
emphasizes the inextricability of the spectacle of punishment from more 
“innocent” spectacles like singing, dancing, and joking; Dunbar’s description 
of African Americans as people who “wear the mask” becomes infused with 
terror and pain in light of Hartman’s description of the antebellum scene of 
slaves called upon to “go before the master:” 
The enslaved were required to sing or dance for the slave 
owner’s pleasure as well as to demonstrate their submission, 
obsequiousness, and obedience.  What was demanded by the 
master was simulation by the enslaved; yet the capitulation of 
the dominated to these demands must be considered as 
pragmatism rather than resignation since one either complied 
with the rules governing socially sanctioned behavior or risked 
punishment.  In addition, these performances constituted acts 
of defiance conducted under the cover of nonsense, 
indirection, and seeming acquiescence.  By virtue of such 
tactics, these performances were sometimes turned against their 
instrumental aims; at the same time, the reliance on 
masquerade, subterfuge, and indirection also obscured the 
small acts of resistance conducted by the enslaved.                  8                    
 
In light of the practice Hartman describes, the purposely, self-
consciously incoherent performance of race begins to seem less transgressive 
than compliant, less liberatory than terror-bound.  And yet Hartman does 
leave space for “acts of defiance conducted under the cover of nonsense, 
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indirection, and seeming acquiescence.”  But how to distinguish one from 
the other?  And where to place oneself as one views and attempts to 
interpret these ambivalent performances? “At issue here,” Hartman writes, 
“is the precariousness of empathy and the uncertain line between 
[sympathetic, politically engaged] witness and [voyeuristic] spectator” (4).  
Following Hartman and Wiegman, I enter this contested and ambivalent 
field of interaction in the hope that humility and sensitivity will allow me to 
perform my readership of the texts at hand in a manner disruptive to my 
own construction as an elite white American subject.    
Hartman, like Butler, describes her critical project in terms that echo 
the methodological approaches of poets working from Modernism forward: 
 My attempt to read against the grain is perhaps best 
understood as a combination of foraging and disfiguration—
raiding for fragments upon which other narratives can be spun 
and misshaping and deforming the testimony through selective 
quotation and the amplification of issues germane to this study.                                                                                
12   
 
If I don’t always read entirely against the grain crafted by the poets under 
consideration, I do intend my readings as creative and critical collaborations 
with those poets against the grain of the larger racial, cultural, linguistic 
matrix in which we are all performing ourselves.  Of course, Hartman is 
famous (or notorious) for blending academic criticism with creative 
nonfiction and historical fiction.  Her creative approach to scholarship is one 
this dissertation bears the traces of.  Hartman’s foregrounding of the mixed 
creative and critical functions latent but disavowed in most critical and 
creative work is of a piece with the critically sophisticated poetry I address 
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here, even if it invites some scholars (especially white men) to view her with 
disdain or scorn.  The three chapters that follow succeed best where they not 
only elucidate but also collaborate with the poets under consideration in 
performing their creative, scholarly, complexly intersectional identities in 
ways disruptive to all manner of coercive expectation; where I can still 
imagine going further in these chapters, it would be to follow my poets in 
imagining unauthorized exits from the intellectual traps that reinscribe bodily 
docility. 
Returning to Mackey, I echo an observation from the beginning of 
Discrepant Engagement:  
Correspondence, counterpoint, and relevance to one another 
exist among authors otherwise separated by ethnic and regional 
boundaries . . .  This fact is especially relevant to . . . the 
frequent assumption that black critics are to write only about 
black writers and that black writers are to be discussed only in 
relation to other black writers.                                         3   
 
The poetry with which this dissertation engages works across not only ethnic 
and regional boundaries, but also across historical period and the high 
culture/mass culture divide.  The particular issue I’m investigating here—
what Harryette Mullen calls “aesthetic apartheid,” the pigeonholing of art 
and artists based upon expectations about the ways in which race will inflect 
expression—leads me to pay special attention to black writers and to writers 
writing black characters; however, I have tried to remain attentive to each 
poet’s multiracial influences, contexts, and import.  And although I am 
interested in exploring the relationship between the aesthetic stances and the 
political investments and implications of these texts, I hope to align myself 
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with Mullen, Mackey, Elizabeth Alexander and others in challenging the 
“perceived division between what [Ron Silliman has called] the ‘Aesthetic 
Schools of writing’ and the ‘codes of oppressed peoples’” (Griffin 11; 
personal conversation with Elizabeth Alexander, February 8, 2007).  The 
notion that any artist could operate free of either aesthetic or political 
framework—even if she wanted to—is ludicrous.  Thus, aware that 
“arbitrarily . . . lump[ing together] . . . black writers . . . obscures their literary 
profundity” (Cornel West, The Yale Journal of Criticism, I, 1 (Fall 1987), 
198-99 quoted in Mackey 3), I have tried to be purposeful in highlighting 
these poets’ distinct literariness, their contributions to American poetry as a 
whole. 
 
Egads, I’m on Television:  Staging Segregated History with A. Van Jordan 
 A. Van Jordan’s collection of dramatic monologues, MacNolia, 
sketches the life of a verbally gifted black woman, a national spelling bee 
contestant, whose educational hopes are quashed by segregation.  This 
chapter attends not only to MacNolia Cox’s experience of racially marked 
verbal virtuosity, but also to the virtuosity with which received forms 
become redefined by the book’s wide variety of talented black characters in 
search of self-determined performative modes.  “I just won/the city-wide 
spelling bee,” MacNolia informs us in the poem “Scenes from My 
Scrapbook,” “and I’m going to the Palace/Theater in Cleveland as the 
special guest of Fats Waller/and Bill ‘Bojangles’ Robinson.  I can spell like 
they can/sing and dance.”  She is figured throughout MacNolia as one of 
many black people in twentieth-century America whose talents both 
empower their subjectivity and render them spectacular objects, an 
ambivalence that recalls Wiegman’s and Hartman’s work.  At the same time, 
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the book employs and discards received forms one after another as if 
searching for a hidden exit. At its most thrilling, MacNolia breaks entirely 
free of its sestinas, terza rimas, and twelve-bar blues, instead possessing 
dictionary definitions and forcing those traditionally dry arbiters of meaning 
to embody the most passionate moments of human biography.   
 It’s tempting to use the word experimental to refer to a book of 
poems so committed to exhausting form (as if to wear it out before 
attempting escape).  But MacNolia’s texture isn’t that of a work of 
experimental poetry, for all its experimentation:  hard as it works to break 
received form, it never challenges received syntax.  Indeed, MacNolia is 
accessible to a fault.  Mackey links “emphasis on accessibility when it comes 
to writers from socially marginalized groups” with “failures or refusals to 
acknowledge complexity among writers from” those groups; both, for 
Mackey, contribute to “shallow, simplistic readings that belabor the most 
obvious aspects of the writer’s work and situation” (17-18).   
 Even at the most fanciful, intimate, or trying moments, MacNolia Cox 
never utters the sort of incoherencies consistent with realism, much less 
experimentalism.  Her speech is always as crisp and poised as her body on 
the day she “polish[ed her] shoes with Kiwi black,” “brush[ed her] teeth with 
baking soda,” and “moisten[ed her] skin with cocoa butter” (102) for the 
Akron District Bee audience.  At odds with her impulse to retire from the 
stage, MacNolia’s speech seems carefully prepared for public consumption.  
Reading MacNolia through the lenses of the 2006 film Akeelah and the Bee 
and Percival Everett’s 2002 novel Erasure, this chapter examines 
ventriloquism, virtuosity, and the dangers of a public gaze that loves to 
spectacularize black bodies. 
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Our Utopia Tis of Thee 
Transgressing formal boundaries even more radically than MacNolia, 
Fanny Howe’s Tis of Thee sprawls somewhere outside and among the 
neighborhoods of opera and narrative poem, dramatic triologue and science 
fiction novel.  Lineated, illustrated, set to music, and acted out, Tis of Thee 
invites us into a miscegenated literary terrain in which the repeated failure 
and fragmentation of a mixed-race family throws into sharp relief a 
fantasized utopian “nation of outcasts— / outside history— . . . / hovering 
above and pressed against / the boundaries of Actual America.” My 
dissertation’s second chapter investigates the pressures that Tis of Thee’s 
family or reproductive model of the nation—and the consequent utopian 
desire for mixed-race bodies—exerts upon such bodies and subjectivities.  
The chapter examines the rhetorical efficacy of Howe’s white character’s 
renunciation of white privilege as well as the relationship between the book’s 
generic liminality and the national and racial liminality it represents.  In 
addition, I consider how Howe’s book—with its explicitly political 
content—meshes with and complicates the politics-of-form questions raised 
by the L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E tradition with which both she and 
Harryette Mullen are associated. 
As the fragmented story of a fragmented family, Tis of Thee invests 
itself deeply in love, intimacy, and empathy as means of racial reconciliation 
and in mixed-race children as longed-for embodiments of a kinder, more just 
future.  At the same time, the mixed-genre book presents itself both as a 
utopian space in which the dream of racial reconciliation can survive and as a 
textual child who embodies miscegenated speech.  The dissertation’s second 
chapter examines critiques of empathy as a response to racial injustice; it 
 17 
articulates a proximity model of empathy that may be more helpful than 
traditional substitution models and teases out the differences between 
fetishizing mixed-race bodies and maintaining intact mixed-race families.  
Finally, it considers text’s intermediate status between visual and aural media, 
suggesting that our physical response to text—subvocalization—may be a 
staging ground for liberatory reinventions of self and even utiopain 
revisionings of society.  
 
Harryette Mullen’s Multilingual Californian Dictionary 
 Harryette Mullen’s poetry collection Sleeping with the Dictionary is 
heavily Oulipo-influenced—that is, invested in playfully foregrounding the 
constraints and conventions that enable its composition.  But whereas 
Oulipian texts typically tend to keep their political projects implicit in favor 
of radical aesthetics for their own sake, Sleeping with the Dictionary quite 
explicitly critiques American consumer culture, white privilege and 
mainstream literary canons.  Mullen has stated her desire to “bridg[e] what 
apparently has been imagined as a gap (or chasm?) between my work as a 
‘black’ poet and my work as a ‘formally innovative’ poet,” and to “overcome 
the social segregation that enforces aesthetic apartheid;”  the demographic 
composition of audiences at live readings of her previous book, Muse and 
Drudge (1995), made her feel she had begun to accomplish such an 
integration.   
Sleeping with the Dictionary continues Muse and Drudge’s project of 
joining disparate discourses, lashing together academic discourse, children’s 
stories, corporatese, and a variety of slangs and jargons.   Sleeping with the 
Dictionary moves away from the extended song of an imagined voice—
however hybrid or collaged that voice might have been—and towards a 
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series of games in which arbitrary rules reveal the linings and foundations of 
our constructed linguistic reality.  This move marks a turn into highly 
interactive poetic territory.  Mullen’s book builds its political agenda via a 
structure of invitation, crafting unorthodox poems that insist its readers 
learn to read, and to see, in new ways, and thus initiating us into the playfully 
critical frame of mind necessary for imagining social change. 
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STEREOTYPE, VENTRILOQUISM, VIRTUOSITY:  A VAN 
JORDAN’S MACNOLIA AND PERCIVAL EVERETT’S ERASURE 
“I'm twice as good as a Negro girl has any right to claim,” MacNolia 
Cox tells us in the final line of “Scenes from My Scrapbook,” a poem at the 
heart of A Van Jordan's MacNolia; “Some people in the society in which I 
live, described as being black, tell me I am not black enough.  Some people 
whom the society calls white tell me the same thing,” Thelonious “Monk” 
Ellison announces in an opening section of Percival Everett’s novel Erasure.  
Both books tell the stories of black protagonists whose verbal intelligence 
places them both metaphorically and literally on stage:  MacNolia is a maid 
and high-school dropout whose prowess at the 1936 National Spelling Bee 
prompted the white judges to eliminate her by presenting a word not on the 
official list; Monk is a novelist whose satirical novel exceeds his control and 
eventually takes him over bodily.   
By virtue of their verbal gifts, both protagonists provide their authors 
with the opportunity for their own displays of verbal virtuosity:  MacNolia’s 
interior and dramatic monologues run through an impressive array of 
received and invented forms, while Erasure, structured as a writer’s personal 
journal, offers the reader the full spectrum of Monk’s output: from his CV 
and a short bio to a conference paper and book reviews to a short story and, 
of course, the centrally problematic novel-within-the-novel.  In their 
virtuosity, MacNolia and Monk both refuse to perform their racial roles in 
accordance with the expectations of the characters who surround them, but 
instead continually exceed the limits others imagine for them.  The texts in 
which they appear, too, are formally excessive, mastering generic boundaries 
by compulsively performing all variations contained therein.  As each book 
probes racially-inflected American social constraints for fissures, it also 
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exhausts a set of literary constraints, covering the generic ground minutely in 
hopes of discovering exits to new territory. 
The first section of this essay addresses Jordan’s examination of 
MacNolia Cox’s transgressions of her assigned identity role, probing her 
articulacy’s consequences for her relationship to socioeconomic class, 
education, employment, gender, and family.  This section’s examination of 
the ambivalent power dynamic of MacNolia’s stage appearance at the 
spelling bee—and of the black body as the object of spectatorship more 
broadly—leads into a short middle section which considers how the recent 
film Akeelah and the Bee represents a black child’s education as a 
corporeally legible project of class mobility.  Finally, the essay’s third section 
follows anxiety about class privilege and about the onscreen presentation of 
the black body through Everett’s Erasure.  Throughout, I will probe these 
books’ representation of uneasy relationships between onstage or on-camera 
performance and the performativity that produces subjects, and examine 
what happens to the possibility of interiority under the condition of 
spectatorship. 
 
MacNolia:  “I Can Spell Like They Can Sing and Dance” 
Though “Scenes from My Scrapbook” doesn't come until a third of 
the way through the book, I imagine Jordan writing it first:  the bare facts of 
MacNolia's biography, as well as gestures towards the book's major tropes, 
are all gathered here.  Indeed, the line “I’m twice as good [at spelling] as a 
Negro girl has any right to claim” names the conflict—between the rich and 
confident interiority she derives from her keen verbal intelligence and the 
selflessly subordinate position her community demands of a “Negro girl”—
that drives the book.  As “Scenes from My Scrapbook” indicates, the book’s 
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conflict is played out in the arena of wordplay (conceived loosely to run the 
gamut from poetry to the sport of spelling) both as theatrical performance—
“I can spell like they can/sing and dance” (lines 7-8)—and as Austinian or 
Butlerian performative—“Before me, what I do had only been a prayer on a 
black girl's tongue”; “My spelling has cast a spell/on this country” (35; 40-1).  
This poem—and the book—are quite clear and explicit on the subject of 
white people’s abuses of power: “they would have that no more/than they 
would have me to win.  They pulled a word not on the list”; “I spell even 
when they tell me to sit in the colored section,/even when they don't give 
scholarships to colored girls for college”(26-7; 32-3).  The racial and 
gendered valences of economic survival are the subject of a more nebulous 
anxiety that pervades the book:  “I'm just not spelling,/ I'm cleaning”; “I've 
got a good man, but he can't do it on his own./These are hard times for the 
white man, can you imagine/what it's like for mine?” (17-18; 20-2).  Both as 
a love story and as the story of a woman's education and career, MacNolia is 
a blues of intelligence, playfulness and optimism betrayed by race and 
gender:  of life in a national community whose identity-role expectations are 
patrolled so rigidly that a woman's eloquence and competence paralyze her 
husband with shame and that a black child's manifest academic talent makes 
“white people afraid” (9). 
 That “they don't give scholarships to colored girls for college” means 
that as an adult, MacNolia finds herself “not spelling,/ . . . [but] cleaning.”  
Her white professional-class employer enforces MacNolia's subordinate 
status and manages his anxiety around her unfulfilled educational and 
economic potential by positioning himself, in his monologue “In Service,” as 
a kind of ringmaster and MacNolia as the sideshow he will display (pages 36-
7).  Whereas most of the monologues in the book employ a lyrical, 
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meditative register that suggests internality, Dr Wittenberg here establishes 
himself as speaking aloud to an interlocutor:  “Come over next week and/ . . 
. we'll show you/What she can do” (5-7), he invites, and in that invitation he 
also invites scrutiny of his own performance as a speaker:  by having 
Wittenberg break from the lyric internality of the bulk of the book, Jordan 
points him up as an unreliable narrator in the tradition of Robert Browning's 
Duke of Ferrara.  Wittenberg purports to be bragging about MacNolia's 
abilities, but the external dramatic monologue form reveals a gap between 
intent and utterance, and from that gap relentlessly seeps Wittenberg’s 
contempt for and fear of MacNolia’s intellect.   
 Dr. Wittenberg spends the first six-and-a-half lines of “In Service” 
setting up his claim:  MacNolia “Is [such] a magician” “with a mop/Or 
broom, a washboard or iron” that “All of our neighbors are jealous” (4, 2-3, 
1); however, when he offers, “bring/Some laundry—we'll show you/What 
she can do” (5-7), it turns out that the “what she can do” that preoccupies 
Wittenberg doesn't have much to do with laundry at all.  Line 7 in its entirety 
reads, “What she can do.  She can spell,” and the next twenty-seven lines are 
devoted to the mastery or disavowal of that ability's implications.   
 In the offer, “we'll show you/What she can do,” Wittenberg asserts 
himself and his family as the owners or agents of MacNolia's ability:  it is not 
she herself, but “we” (presumably the same “our” whose neighbors are 
jealous and “us” with whom she interviewed for the job) who will display 
not only the spelling she is capable of in the present, but also her past 
ability—“Spelled like a demon as a child” (28)—and aspirations—“she 
wanted/to be a surgeon” (13).  Wittenberg paints himself as a benevolently 
powerful master who couldn't “say no” to MacNolia—though parentheses 
make it unclear which he couldn't refuse her:  the opportunity to be a 
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surgeon (13-14) or the grand opportunity to be his maid (16).  His remark 
that MacNolia and her family “seem to do pretty well/For themselves with 
what she makes/Working in service here “ (24-6) also positions him as the 
openhanded provider.   
 Even in illustrating his own munificence, though, Wittenberg seems 
to be maneuvering to avoid any real responsibility to MacNolia:  she does 
pretty well not on “what I pay her,” but on “what she makes,” as if 
Wittenberg himself had nothing to do with MacNolia's wages or with 
whether she did “pretty well” or unqualifiedly well; Wittenberg says he is 
unable to deny MacNolia the opportunity to work for him or the 
opportunity to go to college to be a surgeon, but is strangely silent on the 
topic of whether he offered her assistance—through his money or his 
professional connections—when she (“luck[ily] for us”) “Didn't get a 
scholarship” (17-18).  In her role as his maid, MacNolia is the beneficiary of 
Wittenberg's gracious omnipotence, but as soon as she's beyond his property 
lines—whether seeking a college education or simply “over on North St./In 
a little home with her husband” (21-2), Wittenberg becomes entirely passive 
with respect to her fortunes.  The idea of his supporting her desire for 
education, for greater power and fulfillment as an autonomous human being, 
is as laughably impossible as the idea that she would desire those things in 
the first place—”Would you believe she wanted/to be a surgeon?” (16-7) 
Wittenberg asks with the amused incredulity of one reporting a child's wild 
fantasies.  MacNolia is real and praiseworthy for Wittenberg only insofar as 
she is his childlike employee, his curious plaything to display. 
 His self-inscription in the role of master and controller of MacNolia's 
talents isn't enough to quell Wittenberg's anxieties, however; it is also 
necessary for him everywhere to distance himself from personal knowledge 
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of her intelligence, her past aspirations and her present circumstances.  He 
follows his report of MacNolia's ability to spell “Any word you can pretty 
much/Think of” (8-9) with “although—at least,/I'm not sure—I don't 
believe/She knows what they all mean” (9-11):  the unsettling notion that his 
maid's vocabulary is as good as his own must be defused with the belief that 
her knowledge is rote, born of simple memorization of spellings rather than 
a real working understanding of language.  Even this devaluation of 
MacNolia's ability is preceded by a line and a half of sputtering denial; line 
10, “I'm not sure—I don't believe,” sums up Wittenberg's position as skeptic 
and detractor of the very person whose skill he claims to be advertising.  At 
every turn, Wittenberg's reports of evidence MacNolia's intelligence are 
attributed to mediating sources—”she told us” (15) or “They say” (12, 27, 
29); at every turn, he interjects doubt—”I'm not sure—I don't believe,” “I 
don't know, really” (33).  MacNolia's talent and potential pass into the realm 
of legend or apocrypha, allowing Wittenberg to know and distribute her as 
story even as he staves off the possibility of coming to a direct acquaintance 
with her as a human being; thus he is able to dismiss the fantasy of the poor 
black girl who “They say . . . almost went to college” (12) and reestablish the 
inevitability and unquestionable rightness of the status quo in his final 
dismissal of the topic:  “I don't know, really, but I'm telling you—/She's the 
best damn maid in town” (33-4). 
 In its context within the book, “In Service” also functions as the last 
in a trilogy of poems about service, labor, and how they function in the life 
MacNolia shares with her husband, John.  “Looking for Work” (page 32-3) 
introduces the issue; unemployed, John describes himself as “like the snake's 
body//without the head but the haunting/memory of what his purpose is” 
(22-4).  In contrast, “MacNolia's body . . . still//stands tall and soft beneath 
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her apron/and gloves, her housedress and rags” (4-6), the badges of her job 
at Dr. Wittenberg's.  Despite the fact that his unemployment makes him 
“like all the other men” (1), John's awareness that MacNolia's labor is 
providing for them while he is unable to do so separates him bodily both 
from MacNolia (“I rub my hands over fire-mouthed barrels/instead of 
MacNolia's body”) (3-4) and, in the figure of the headless snake, from his 
own torso—as if the “purpose,” the missing job, were a body part—the 
body part that would make a connection between John and MacNolia 
possible.  Though a psychoanalytic argument about the phallus feels 
inevitable, I suspect rather that what is missing are John's vocal cords:  while 
the poem features “fire-mouthed barrels” and John “lick[ing] my hands” 
(15), the mouth and tongue are unable to speak.  “At supper, what can/I say 
to her?  What can I say?//I lick my hands” instead of speaking (13-5).  Even 
the “freedom songs” of the women in service are “songs to be lived not 
sung” (12-3).   
 John's claim to “wonder from where/the next meal will conjure” (17-
8) more subtly invokes the poem's link between speech and earning power:  
literally to conjure a meal would be to create it by speaking a spell—to make 
food from a speech-act.  The question smuggles its own answer:  it is 
MacNolia who, two poems later, will be pronounced a “magician” (“In 
Service” 4), MacNolia whose “spelling has cast a spell” (“Scenes from My 
Scrapbook” 40).  In the poems where Jordan develops John and MacNolia's 
relationship, it is always MacNolia who trusts and delights in language, 
speaking in a variety of verse forms; who trusts the power of speech; who 
believes language to be alive and intimately connected with the body.  It is 
John who prefers silence and simple language, speaking with only three 
exceptions (“Wedding Night,” “rant,” “Death Letter Blues Ghazal”) in 
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modest prose or free verse; who seeks to separate language from the body; 
who sets up oppositions such as “lived not sung.” 
 Nowhere is this contrast in their understandings of language's 
relationship to the body more apparent than in their shared tanka series, 
“Wedding Night” (page 29-31).  Though in their courtship poems “The 
Moment Before He Asks MacNolia Out on a Date” and “Meeting John 
Montiere” John already sets himself up in competition with books for 
MacNolia's attention, it is in “Wedding Night” that John and MacNolia 
address each other directly on the subject.  John begins the poem: 
 
let's strip off our words 
to speak without our tongues.  let's 
try to tongue without 
saying a word.  let's turn speech 
back into struggle tonight. 
 
In John's understanding of human identity, words are external, excessive; 
they can be removed like clothing; the body—“flesh to comfort me” (“John 
Montiere:  answer to question one,” p 22, ii)—is sexier, more vulnerable, 
without them.   
 MacNolia takes a more performative, Butlerian stand:  “our language 
frames us/as we resemble our words” (26-7).  John has imagined himself to 
be the knowledgeable and experienced one, reading her body in “The 
Moment Before He Asks MacNolia Out on a Date” as if it were a book—“I 
can look at her shoes,/ . . . Look at any woman's walk,/ . . . And I can tell all 
I need to know” (22, 25, 34)—and what was written there was innocence—
“I can tell she has never . . .” (2).  But now, faced with MacNolia's insistence 
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that it is language that is comforting, connective, sexy—”there's always a 
language born/out of the struggle to touch” (“Wedding Night” 19-20)—he 
is forced to admit, “I don't know if I/have the words to touch” a lover's 
body (21-2).   
 Although MacNolia's final stanza breaks off two lines short, shedding, 
per John's wishes, words at the moment when her “wedding/dress falls to 
our floor” (37-8), she submits to John's wishes only after he has accorded 
her a position of power and knowledge in the relationship:  in “and here I 
thought I/was teaching you!” (31-2), John admits a reversal of the roles of 
power and instruction that his courtship poems have revealed him to expect.  
MacNolia's argument that people exist in their words and that a relationship 
is created from the merging of words shows John “a mirror in/which I see a 
stranger” (33-4).  Although John's next exclamation is, “how/good it is to 
meet me when—” (34-5, italics Jordan's), and although the poem's ending 
indicates accord, union, a sexy compromise between words and the silent 
body, never again in the book does John speak with the easy confidence of 
“The Moment Before He Asks MacNolia Out on a Date;” forever after their 
wedding night, he marks himself (as in “Looking for Work”) as inadequate 
to and next to MacNolia, his monologues marked by shame and the desire to 
retreat into silence. 
 In John's final monologue—the last poem of the book's first half—he 
remembers having come home from hearing Nat King Cole and “looked at 
MacNolia and wished/I could be the silver-voiced one” (“Unforgettable” p 
70, 37-8).  Ostensibly John is fantasizing about being as attractive a mate as 
Nat King Cole, but in this couplet it seems to be MacNolia he wants to trade 
places with.  MacNolia and Cole become one figure, as their talents—
wordplay and singing—become one.  In fact, MacNolia paces obsessively 
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between black entertainers of the stage and screen on the one hand and 
MacNolia, the competitive speller, on the other, thereby situating her 
competitive spelling career within an economy of racialized performance and 
spectatorship.  In her prose monologue “On Stage” (divided into five prose 
blocks like the five acts of a play), MacNolia probes her ambivalent 
relationship with her mostly-white, mostly-adult Akron Armory audience.  In 
this venue, more commonly used for more corporeal entertainments like 
“circuses, boxing, or wrestling” (i), the crowd is alternately threatening—
”hungry” (ii), “showing its teeth” (iv)—and comforting—“supportive” (iv), 
“a proud parent, smiling” (iv); the spelling child onstage “maybe . . . [feels] 
underdressed for the lights and applause” (ii), but also “feel[s] as if [she's] 
being inflated on stage” (iii), becoming a giant at which the crowd “gasps” 
and “shrieks” (iii)—at once freakish and powerful; both the power and the 
vulnerability reside not in the spelling mind or voice, but in the visibly staged 
body. 
 Both in MacNolia's fantasy of her “inflated, brown body” (iii) and in 
her mother's prose block of instructions for foiling the spelling bee officials' 
racist expectations (v), MacNolia's bodily staging is shaped by the play of 
power between white spectators and legible black bodies; as the power 
dynamic shifts back and forth, alternately placing MacNolia at the mercy of 
the spectators' gaze and the spectators in the thrall of MacNolia's, the model 
of racial spectatorship wavers between the panoptic (with a central viewer 
exerting power over many subjects) and the spectacular (wherein many 
viewers are enthralled by one object).  The panoptic surveillance model of 
social control supplants the model based upon spectacles of punishment in 
Michel Foucault's historical account, but in “Visual Modernity,” Robyn 
Wiegman describes “the spectacle” as “the culminating moment for the 
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panoptic's reinforcement” (39) in the case of the ritualized KKK violence 
which enforced Jim Crow social order.  “Legally instituted segregation . . . 
established a panoptic regime,” Wiegman explains, which “radiated its 
significatory value through the ever-present production of community gazes, 
inscriptions that read and rendered the truth of the body and, in doing so, 
produced the experiential truth of the subject as well” (40); when black and 
white bodies come together in such a segregated community, “the 
omnipresent gaze of the white eye” (40) threatens the black body with 
spectacular violence.   
 Onstage in Akron, though, MacNolia finds herself in parallel or even 
collaboration with her white audience:  “you were trapped there and so was 
the crowd” (ii); “they want to see you spell—not see you spell in a circus-act 
way, mind you, but in an adult-looking-at-a-child-in-wonderment way—and 
they will applaud when you open your mouth . . . and then you realize you're 
not alone” but in the company of the other, white, spellers (iv).  The second-
person perspective of the poem invites the reader, too, to become part of 
the integrated group of “teenagers” who exercise a hypnotic power over the 
white adult spectators:  “tethered to the stage, the crowd listens as if a great 
light commanded their attention” (i).  Still, MacNolia's status as the lone, 
perhaps token, black body onstage, her vulnerability to the crowd's as well as 
the officials' judgment, situates her in a “visible econom[y] that . . . feature[s] 
integration without equality, representation without power” (Wiegman 41).  
By having MacNolia imaginatively both acknowledge and disavow the 
crowd's ravenous hostility and the alienness of her own body in their eyes, 
Jordan holds in suspension a utopian dream of integration and the threat 
that “integration beckons . . . difference as commodity” (Wiegman 41).   
 That a body no longer corporeally, geographically segregable will now 
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be itself visually marketed for consumption threatens black entertainers 
increasingly, Weigman suggests, as our cultural life increasingly depends 
upon the visual media of “cinema, television, and video where the circulation 
of representational images partake in a panoptic terrain by serving up bodies 
as narrative commodities.”  MacNolia presents stage performers' 
negotiations with white audiences as similarly fraught.  “Time Reviews The 
Ziegfeld Follies Featuring Josephine Baker, 1936,” for example, uses the 
obsessive repetitions of the sestina form (triply obsessive, since not only is 
this a double sestina on the same six end-words, but those end-words are 
italicized for extra emphasis) to dramatize anxiety over which performer—
Baker or the white Fanny Brice—is the more attractive commodity.  Simply 
scanning the end-words clues us into the visuality of the assessment being 
made (paint, race), the audience who gets to assess (men, Time), and the 
most immediate stakes of the contest (applause, diamonds).  The Time 
reviewer who speaks the first six stanzas represents Baker as “a life-size 
black doll” (11), “a street woman” “flaunting her . . . wares” (18, 11-12), a 
morsel to eat, seasoned “sweet or tart” with “the spice of race” (26, 25).  She 
is inanimate, disposable, consumable.  Brice is twice called a “diamond” (8, 
36), as is Eve Arden (23)—white women entertainers are also commodity 
items, but expensive, durable ones.   
 While Baker's response also aligns herself with diamonds—and 
diamonds, in turn, with a cheaper commodity, coal (63-9)—the relationship 
Jordan has her trace among race, entertainment, and personal worth is more 
complicated.  “Race/is not real, only light and love” (61-2), Baker declares; 
“I'm merely a diamond/Trying to catch some light under the paint” (72-3).  
Baker's diamond doesn't allow “race [to]/Refract in its eye” (60-1); it “holds 
so much truth because it endures time;/It struggles through nothingness for 
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applause/ . . . dark, naked without paint” (64-6).  The poem positions the 
diamond as a praise-craving kernel that preexists both race and the paint 
necessary to the stage.  What is “under” (38) or “underneath” (68) is raceless, 
durable, praise-craving, loveable; race itself is aligned with stage-paint:  
theatrical, sheddable.  Baker doesn't need rave reviews from white American 
publications, she claims, because can base her confidence on her fiancé's 
love and the approval of “all the men//On the Champs[-Elysées]” (54-5).   
 When Baker insists, “I'm under the paint” (38), when she illustrates 
her worthiness by telling us her fiancé “stays with me when I take off the 
paint,/And he doesn't care about this whole race/Hoopla; he loves 
Josephine for me” (46-8), she manages to remain rigidly in the character of 
traditional heterosexual femininity, utterly dependent upon male approval (a 
secondary reading of “he loves Josephine for me” might be “I can't even 
love myself—I need a man to do that”), while identifying race (as well as 
theatrical, commodified sexuality) as an identity category to be donned or 
shed at will.  Since, as Timothy Scheie points out, “a willful intent to 
transgress the sanctioned categories of identity . . . posits a subject whose 
identity precedes and motivates the performance” (20), Baker would seem to 
be treating race less like the kind of Butlerian performative identity that one 
takes on more or less involuntarily through repetition, but rather, like the 
kind of theatrical role “Butler often defines the performative against” (Scheie 
18).  Still, at the sestina's end, Baker indicates that romance solves less and 
race matters more than she has heretofore admitted—”even my man/Who, 
after all, is white, doesn't see” Baker the way she sees herself (70-1); though 
she is confident that “race problems will change with time,” she expects that 
change to come “Long after applause and this diamond's light fades” (74-5).   
 Back in Akron, MacNolia's mother prepares her to take the stage in a 
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manner calculated to make what change it can in the audience's notions of 
blackness.  Alberta Cox herself is confident that it is precisely the “Her 
darkness, . . . her dark wake” that “Sways in inverse light behind a 
man's/Eyelids” (“Morena,” p 87-8, 21-3), and she identifies the source of 
that darkness not in skin, but in speech.  It is “the vowels on a 
dark/Woman's lips” that make “men walk in silence” (9-10, 6); “In her 
throat,//Lives a lump of coal, which does not aspire/To emerge as a 
diamond” (18-20).  Alberta characterizes the sexy, confident “black-licorice 
world/Beneath these everyday clothes” as “the secret/Evidence of faith” (4-
5, 2-3)—a faith in the reality that her oral performance produces.  Here as in 
Bourdieu's argument which Butler examines in the “Implicit Censorship” 
chapter of Excitable Speech, “one hears . . . Althusser's invocation of Pascal 
in the explaining of ideology:  one kneels in prayer, and only later acquires 
belief” (ES 155).   
 By speaking in a way that performs blackness as attractive and 
confident, Alberta creates herself as an attractive and confident black 
woman; as her nervous thirteen-year-old daughter prepares herself for the 
scrutiny of “4,000 blue eyes” (“On Stage” iv), Alberta seeks to transmit, via 
the poem's final prose block, her attractiveness and confidence to MacNolia 
in a tough pep talk.  Repeating the phrases “I told you” and “Tell me” like a 
mantra, like a spell, Alberta reminds MacNolia that racist whites “already 
know you're not smart enough; don't confirm it by losing” (v).  The litany of 
commands with which she girds MacNolia for her performance warn her 
that her body will be read as intently as the letters she pronounces—indeed, 
the first, “Say the letters clearly so they don't think all Negro girls have thick 
tongues,” draws attention to the physical site of the production of speech, 
the point where language touches and breaks off from the body. 
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 Though strategies for speaking and listening to win the competition 
begin and end the prose block, most of its length is dominated by the 
imperative to manage the appearance of the body.  From the erect spine out 
through the soaked, unsunburned, moistened skin, the slip, the polished 
shoes and the beribboned hair, every physical detail must work in concert to 
ward off the threat of “confirm[ing] it.”  Butler describes “the abiding 
incongruity of the speaking body, the way in which it exceeds its 
interpellation, and remains uncontained by any acts of speech” (155).  
Something always remains not yet interpreted, not yet incorporated into 
cultural systems of meaning.  As Alberta prepares MacNolia to face a 
potentially racist white audience, she seeks to determine in advance as much 
of the body's meaning as possible, minimizing incongruous excesses that 
might open themselves to racist interpretation.  A DuBoisian double-
consciousness is at work in MacNolia's preparation for the stage as tutored 
by her mother:  she must develop the skill of “looking at one's self through 
the eyes of others”—not in order to “measur[e] one's soul by the tape of a 
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Souls 2), but rather, in 
order to measure the body in hopes of warding off such contemptuous 
evaluations of the soul, in hopes of protecting the interiority as a space 
neither surveilled nor judged by white spectators. 
 
Akeelah and the Bee:  The Class Frontier 
Arriving in 2004 amongst a spate of spelling-bee movies—
Spellbound, 2002; Bee Season, 2005; Akeelah and the Bee, 2006—MacNolia 
intervenes in a visual discourse of gendered, classed, and nationally inflected 
pedagogy just at a moment when, on the one hand, increasing emphasis on 
standardized testing in schools has elicited a flurry of anxiety about the status 
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of rote learning in national public education, and on the other, race has 
ceded some ground to class—as constituted through education and 
economic allegiance—as the criterion for access to power, both in movies 
like Akeelah and in the Bush administration itself.  The spelling bee seems a 
telling institution for our popular imagination to seize on:  it’s an exercise 
both peculiarly American and multiply nostalgic.  Writing in 1941,  Allen 
Walker Read reports that “by the middle of the [nineteenth] century [spelling 
bees] had gained the aura of romantic charm with which we invest the 
incidents of childhood” (502) and “in 1917 a member of the American 
Academy of Arts and Letters lamented the passing of ‘our delightful national 
fame, now obsolete, of spelling-bees’” (511; Read quotes William Crary 
Brownell, “The Academy and the Language,” in Proceedings of the Special 
Meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Letters . . . February 22, 
1917, p 19).  Associating the spelling bee with rusticity and community 
naiveté, Read tells us, 
The institution which the East had outgrown was transplanted, 
however, in the simpler environment of the western frontier, 
and there it came to a new flowering.  The attainment of 
conventional spelling was a symbol of culture, and therefore 
the frontier adopted this expedient to reach it.  As a sociologist 
has pointed out, “the frontier society traverses in a 
comparatively few decades the ascent from a low to a high 
culture.”  
(502; Read quotes James G Leyburn, Frontier Folkways (New 
Haven, Conn., 1935), p 3) 
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The resurfacing—now onscreen—of the spelling bee as a site where 
American identities can be constituted and contested implies, then, an 
anxiety that the nation may still contain some frontiers where cultural 
uplift is required. 
Akeelah and the Bee is particularly interesting for its representation of 
early 21st-century Los Angeles as a milieu in which the black “lower-class 
mass” still struggles with poverty and inferior education, but where well-
educated black aristocracy—that is, a UCLA professor played by Laurence 
Fishburne—tend tidy gardens or ponder in well-appointed studies right 
around the corner.  Studying with Fishburne’s character, Dr. Larrabee, 
Akeelah prepares herself for the ESPN-televised Scripps National Spelling 
Bee; over the months, as Larrabee disciplines Akeelah’s manners, grammar, 
and knowledge of the black canon, the audience witnesses another 
transformation upon which the film makes no explicit remark:  her style of 
dress and coiffure, which at the beginning of the film reflect those of her 
peers at a poor inner-city school, slowly adapt to fit in with her new friends 
at a wealthy suburban school where the children of well-educated whites, 
Chicanos, and (after an initial reluctance) Asians welcome her into their 
circle.  Like the other tidy, polite and well-spoken minority children in her 
new set, Akeelah has surmounted the new American frontier:  class.  
 The implication is that poor inner-city black people have been 
imperfectly assimilated into the nation, that their community remains 
rusticated, that they still need to “traverse the ascent from a low to a high 
culture.”  Such a process of sophistication apparently goes hand in hand with 
consumption:  wear more expensive clothes, study and play with higher-class 
peers, aspire to live in a tasteful, graciously-lawned suburban home like 
Akeelah’s new friend Javier’s family.  Much like the Bush cabinet, Akeelah’s 
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new social circle is populated by people of every skin color—but these 
people all speak standard English, all seem to subscribe to the Protestant-
capitalist notion that wealth is the just reward for hard work, all belong to 
traditional nuclear families, and all apparently shop from the same catalogue.  
In Akeelah’s vision, race ceases to be a problem at the moment when one is 
inducted into a success-oriented middle-class cultural homogeneity.  This 
notion functions as a corollary to media representations of black people as 
comprising an unemployed and uneducated underclass:  at the moment one 
becomes upwardly mobile, in this paradigm, one effectively stops being 
black.     
 
Erasure:  “You Ain’t Quite Dark Enough, Darlin’” 
Erasure, too, treats the preparation of the black body for television, 
but the novel is not so sanguine about class’s ability to trump race in early 
21st-century Los Angeles.  The scene of a black man being prepared to 
appear before a live and television audience is rehearsed three times in the 
novel:  twice in works of fiction that the novel’s protagonist, Monk Ellison, 
writes, and a third time when Ellison himself, as Stagg R Leigh, goes on a 
talk show to promote his novel.  Monk’s horrified fascination with 
television’s perpetuation and physicalization of racist discourse both helps to 
inspire the novel My Pafology and to make that novel into the monster that 
destroys Monk. 
We first watch Monk watching television when he happens to catch 
Juanita Mae Jenkins being “welcomed by a talk show host named Kenya 
Dunston who had put Ms. Jenkins’ book on her Book Club reading list” 
(52).  Jenkins’s book, We’s Lives in da Ghetto, strikes Monk as “a real slap in 
the face.  It was like strolling through an antique mall, feeling good, liking 
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the sunny day and then turning the corner to find a display of watermelon-
eating, banjo-playing darkie carvings and a pyramid of Mammy cookie jars” 
(29); nevertheless, it is a “runaway bestseller” whose film rights have sold for 
“something like three million dollars” (28-9).  The talk show’s immediate 
focus is on the number of copies sold and the financial success of Jenkins’s 
book; the two women, though they presumably have never met before, 
appear instantly bonded, first by an initial hug, then through the shared use 
of casual, lower-class black speech patterns (“Girl, you gone be rich;” 
“Sho’nough;” “a lotta money, right, girlfriend?”) (53) despite their obvious 
middle-classness, and then by the revelation of the formulaic nature of 
Jenkins’s life: 
“I went to Oberlin for a couple of years, then moved to New 
York.” 
“A man?” 
“Ain’t it always?” 
The audience laughed. 
“Well, that didn’t work out,” Ms. Jenkins said. 
“Never does.” 
“Never does.”                                                                     (53)                                                                                                   
Part of Jenkins’s appeal seems to be that the life story she tells is so 
unremarkable, so according to stereotype, that Dunston and the audience 
can guess its details.  During this interview it comes out that “When I 
[Jenkins] was twelve I went to visit some relatives in Harlem for a couple of 
days and that’s where the novel comes from . . . I got this job at a publishing 
house. . . and I thought, where are the books about our people?  Where are 
our stories?” (53).  Not only is it outrageous that anyone who had spent “a 
couple of days” in a place would presume to write a novel claiming to 
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capture its essence, but Jenkins’s conflation of herself with impoverished 
New Yorkers like those in her book illustrates DuBois’s observation, in The 
Dusk of Dawn, that “the Negro group is spoken of continually as one 
undifferentiated low-class mass” (183)—even Jenkins, with her publishing-
house job and her Oberlin background, apparently can’t (or chooses not to) 
tell herself apart from that “low-class mass;” her novel and her television 
performance assure her audience that neither is her story different from 
theirs nor is their story different from what can be extrapolated from a 
couple of days’ stay in Harlem and a lifetime’s exposure to stereotyped 
portrayals (many of them, most likely, on television).  So far from worrying 
about whether her stereotyped performance of race will, in Alberta Cox’s 
words, “confirm it,” Juanita Mae Jenkins performs perfectly according to 
television’s script—and finds it highly profitable. 
 Not so Monk.  His self-performance through language, written and 
spoken, marks him “not black enough.”  “I have heard this mainly about my 
novels, from editors who have rejected me and reviewers whom I have 
apparently confused and, on a couple of occasions, on a basketball court 
when upon missing a shot I muttered Egads” (2).  Monk practices language 
as he does partly because of the self-consciously upper-middle class way his 
parents raised him:  his childhood memories include being scolded for saying 
“crap” (143) and having his “Sorry” corrected to the complete sentence “I’m 
sorry” (144).  At the same time, Monk’s idiosyncratically academic, 
introverted mindset stands out even within his family, and it is language that 
always betrays him, as in another childhood memory of making a blunder in 
a basketball game because he was thinking of “the racist comments of Hegel 
concerning Oriental peoples” (134).  Upon confessing he was thinking not 
about the shot he was making but about Hegel (and after explaining who 
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Hegel is), Monk is told he’d “better Hegel on home.”   
 It’s not that Monk is “putting on” or enjoys being isolated; his equally 
upper-middle-class black childhood friends are able to “step into scenes and 
change completely” (166) by using words and phrases like Solid, Dig, Yo, 
What’s up?, What it is?, You better step back, and Gots to be crazy (167), 
and those words sound “casual, comfortable, and, most importantly, cool” 
(167), yet he just can’t manage to “talk the talk” (166).  “In fact, to my ear, it 
never sounded real coming from anyone” (167)—the performance of race 
according to televised expectations is always already tainted, for Monk, by 
his awareness of those expectations.   
When he rebuffs suggestions that he “write the true, gritty stories of 
black life” with the observation that he is “living a black life, far blacker 
than” anyone “could ever know” (2, emphasis Everett’s), Monk, of course, 
doesn’t mean that he has suffered socioeconomically or educationally in the 
ways that MacNolia Cox did half a century before.  Struggling against an 
official, legally sanctioned apartheid system, MacNolia seeks the stage as an 
opportunity both to advance her own educational and socioeconomic 
possibilities and to represent black people in a way that disrupts white 
racists’ expectations of stupidity, inarticulacy, and slovenliness.  By contrast, 
Monk, the son of a doctor, is a UCLA professor with degrees from Harvard 
and UC Irvine; he has received an NEA fellowship and three Pushcart prizes 
(57).  Racist expectations hound him in a less obvious, more internalized 
way:  consistent with his educational and socioeconomic status, Monk 
wishes for the privacy and non-representationality that accrue to those who 
enjoy white privilege.1  For all his verbal agility, he is unable or unwilling to 
                                                
1 Much like MacNolia, Akeelah—after some urging—willingly seeks the spotlight and the role of 
representative in hopes of economically improving her educational opportunities:  her principal hopes to 
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master the educated-African-American art of code-switching, and so he has 
never felt at home in “black” language.  He eventually stops imagining his 
friends identifying him as the one who “talks like he’s stuck up?  Sounds 
white?  Can’t even play basketball” (167), but among non-academics—
especially working- and lower-class people—the performance of language 
that feels authentic to Monk still makes him “awkward, out of place, like I 
had [felt] so much of my life, like I didn’t belong” (21).  
Monk’s discomfort with the idea of “black” language is what 
immediately precipitates the creation of My Pafology and its fictional author, 
Stagg R. Leigh:  overcome with nausea at a literary industry that can embrace 
Juanita Mae Jenkins while rejecting his own novels even as it calls them 
“challenging and masterfully written and constructed” (42), Monk imagines  
 
people in the street shouting dint, ax, fo, screet and fahvre!  and I was 
screaming inside, complaining that I didn’t sound like that, that my 
mother didn’t sound like that, that my father didn’t sound like that 
and I imagined myself sitting on a park bench counting the knives in 
my switchblade collection and a man came up to me and he asked me 
what I was doing and my mouth opened and I couldn’t help what 
came out, “Why fo you be axin?” 
I put a page in my father’s old manual typewriter.  I wrote this novel, 
a book on which I knew I could never put my name.                                            
(61-2) 
Thus, from Monk’s rage at a publishing industry unwilling to reward his 
erudition and virtuosity, from his fury at the power of the economic 
                                                                                                                                       
parlay the television publicity of her success into better funding for the hopelessly impoverished—and 
mostly black—school she attends. 
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incentive for black artists to perpetuate the very racist stereotypes that dog 
them, My Pafology is born, and in the moment that Monk imagines his 
mouth opening and “Why fo you be axin?” coming out, the book and its 
fictional author are already possessing and performing through his speaking 
body. 
  Near My Pafology’s dramatic apex we find Monk’s first rehearsal of 
television’s treatment of black bodies.  The book’s juvenile delinquent 
protagonist, Van Go Jenkins, gets a call from a talk show:  “We want you to 
be our guest on Snookie Cane . . . we have a guest who wants to surprise you 
with something.  Someone who has a crush on you” (109).  Go, designed by 
Monk particularly as a representative of the stereotypical “low-class mass,” is 
of course elated.  But as we might surmise, Go has been lured to the show 
on false pretenses and is actually confronted on national television by the 
four mothers of his four children, gathered to humiliate him in retaliation for 
non-payment of child support; after the audience have enjoyed the spectacle 
of their bickering, Snookie Cane brings out her pièce de résistance:  two 
policemen who have come to arrest Go for the Native Son-reminiscent rape 
of a wealthy young black woman (113-8).  Snookie Cane and her backers at 
Optic White Studios display Go’s sexual amorality, the four mothers’ 
poverty and distress, and the young woman’s rape not in a quest for justice 
or as an illustration (a la Native Son’s Mr. Max) of the evils of racial and 
economic inequality, but as entertainment for the sake of financial gain.   
In her essay “Endangered/Endangering,” Judith Butler poses 
the question, “If racism pervades white perception, structuring what 
can and cannot appear within the horizon of white perception, then to 
what extent does it interpret in advance ‘visual evidence’?” (205).  On 
the Snookie Cane show, though, the racist visual evidence is not even 
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left up to advance interpretation, but planted in the form of bodies 
manufactured as racist parodies of themselves:  before Go even 
makes it to the stage, the studio make-up artist has already revealed 
that the Snookie Cane show will be a humiliating blackface spectacle 
by “spread[ing] vaseline on [Go’s] face . . . ‘This will make you shine 
like a proper TV nigger,’ he say” (112).  The show’s treatment of Go’s 
body marks Snookie Cane as the 1990s equivalent of the “blackface 
minstrel” “Tom Show,” a form of entertainment that Ralph Ellison 
“had thought [hoped?] . . . a thing of the past” when he happened 
upon a poster for one just before starting to work on Invisible Man 
(xvi).  Television, that engrossing box of plastic and glass, literalizes 
the glass box W.E.B. DuBois describes in Dusk of Dawn as “the full 
psychological meaning of caste segregation:” on racist television, as in 
DuBois’s segregated America, it is as if “some thick sheet of invisible 
but horribly tangible plate glass” intervened between the “entombed 
souls” and “the world” (130-1).  As Ellison points out, “what is 
commonly assumed to be past history is actually as much a part of the 
living present as William Faulkner insisted” (xvi), perhaps even more 
so in the age of burgeoning mass entertainment; even after the 
demonstrations of treachery he has experienced, at the very moment 
when he is being beaten and dragged off to jail, Go doesn’t “care.  
The cameras is pointin at me.  I be on the TV.  The cameras be full of 
me.  I on TV.  I say, ‘Hey, Mama.’ I say, ‘Hey, Baby Girl.  Look at me.  
I on TV’” (131)—so seductive is the spectacle of television, Monk’s 
story claims, that we clamor to be cast in Tom shows and locked in 
DuBois’s glass box. 
  In his short story “Àppropos de bottes,” Monk paints an even 
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more bleakly stylized portrait of the rigged racist game of television 
entertainment.  This Tom show’s protagonist, Tom Wahzetepe, 
wishes to compete on the quiz show Virtute et Armis, a show as 
transparently fixed along racial lines as the state (Mississippi) from 
whose motto it draws its name.  In order to be considered for the 
show, Tom first has fifteen minutes to answer four ridiculously 
difficult questions requiring detailed abstruse knowledge of 
entomology, French nineteenth-century opera, calculus, and 
automotive engineering history (169-71).  This challenge poses him no 
difficulty; soon he finds himself in Makeup: 
 
One of the women . . . reached over to the cart which was 
beside the chair and came back with her fingertips coated with 
a brown cream. 
“What’s that?” Tom asked. 
“You ain’t quite dark enough, darlin’,” she said.  She began to 
rub the compound into the skin of Tom’s face.  “This is TV 
stuff.”  
. . . The skinny woman came back with a white shirt . . . The 
collar turned out to be just a tad tight.                                (173) 
 
Like Go, Tom is required to put blackface on over his black face 
before being allowed on television, but Tom isn’t even turned over to the 
police before he finds his neck in jeopardy—television gets to paint him and 
lynch him, symbolically at least.  Then he’s being led toward the stage, and 
“for the first time, he was nervous.  He had to win this game.  He just had to 
win.  But he also knew how this game worked.  It wasn’t up to him” (174).  
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As the lights come up and Tom is ready to face his blond opponent in front 
of the audience’s “ocean of blue eyes,” the host tells Tom, “I’m sure you’ll 
do fine and be a credit to your race” (175).  In the contest that follows, 
Tom’s opponent, Hal Dullard, “did not know that a gorilla was a primate.  
He did not know the abbreviation for Avenue.  He did not know what a 
male chicken was called” (177), while Tom correctly describes anaphase and 
a serial distribution field, identifies a tenth-century Arabic poem, and quotes 
the first eleven lines of Emerson’s “Self-Reliance” (175-8).  When Tom is 
named champion by the reluctant host, “the audience made no sounds.  
They were dead” (178).  The stakes of this entertainment are life and death; 
Tom’s white opponent, like MacNolia’s, will be “given chances” to win, 
whereas black contestants, fighting racist expectations, must give the correct 
answers “and make it crisp as a virgin’s bed” (“Covering the Spelling Bee,” p 
121-3, 43-4).   
Given these imaginations of television’s manipulation of the black 
body and intellect, it’s little wonder that when Monk himself—as Stagg—is 
invited by Kenya Dunston to give a television appearance, he refuses 
makeup, preferring instead to sit behind a screen (246); the screen itself, 
though, may simply be another trap, reminiscent as it is of the DuBoisian 
screen or veil.  “Had I,” Monk asks himself, “by annihilating my presence 
actually asserted the individuality of Stagg Leigh? . . . Would I have to kill 
Stagg to silence him?  And what did it mean that I was even thinking of 
Stagg as having agency?” (248).  To be Stagg, Monk goes voluntarily behind 
DuBois’s screen; despite his vow, early in Stagg’s life, that “I was not going 
to put on an act for” the publishers and public who admire My Pafology, an 
act is precisely what Stagg is.  To silence him and to kill him are the same:  
Stagg is Monk’s performance according to racist expectation, the 
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performance of language that he has spent his life and his artistic integrity 
refusing.  Kenya Dunston is not wrong when she says of Stagg’s disguised, 
screened, glass-box-mediated television appearance, “it doesn’t get any more 
real than this” (251):  “the production of the subject has everything to do 
with the regulation of speech” (ES 133); to speak as Stagg—to embody the 
racial expectations that threaten Monk’s integrity as an author and as a 
person—is to produce Stagg and cancel Monk.  
 Butler writes, “The condition for the subject’s survival is precisely the 
foreclosure of what threatens the subject most fundamentally” (135), and 
what threatens Monk most fundamentally is the racist objectification of 
black speech as the kind of instantly recognizeable, lower-class commodity 
which leaves no room for the creative, opinionated, and linguistically rich 
interiority that typifies Monk’s subjectivity.  Erasure ends at the moment of 
Monk’s erasure—the moment when he must publicly announce that he is 
Stagg, that he is objectifier and object, commodifier and commodity.  In 
uttering his final words of the novel, “Egads, I’m on television” (265), Monk 
merges his own signature interjection—his own diction—with that of his 
most hated creation, Van Go Jenkins; the two realms of language represent, 
for him, antitheses, mutual realms of unspeakability.  “To move outside the 
domain of speakability is to risk one’s status as a subject” (ES 133); 
Monk/Stagg/Go dissolves or linguistically implodes into insanity. 
 
Stereotype, Ventriloquism, Virtuosity 
MacNolia Cox’s fate, though not as glorious as it could perhaps have 
been in a more just world, is anyway kinder than Monk’s.  Preparing 
MacNolia for the spelling bee, Alberta hopes that a performance of 
competence, intelligence, attractiveness, and dignity from MacNolia will 
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defy—and thus help to alter—the white audience’s expectations.  Although 
MacNolia is cheated of her chance to win the National Spelling Bee and 
denied the opportunity to go to college, she continues until her death to 
define the word “MacNolia” as “a Negro who spells/And reads as well as (if 
not better than) any white” (“This Life,” pp58-9, 17-8); even on her 
deathbed, her husband observes “Her lips/[which] Curl like dry, burning 
leaves” as mirroring “her book’s curled, yellow pages” (“Mercy, Mercy, 
Mercy, pp 15-7, 14-5, 9).  If by “the logic of iterability that governs the 
possibility of social transformation” (ES 147), to spend a lifetime performing 
language contrary to racist expectation eventually goes some way towards 
changing that expectation, then perhaps MacNolia’s lifelong “savoring [of] 
what you learn/And spit[ting] it back as best you know how” (“This Life” 
33-4) can be read as an utterance which “performatively produces a shift in 
the terms of legitimacy as an effect of the utterance itself” (147)—that is, as 
a performance of verbal intelligence, and of pleasure in that intelligence, that 
offers something towards dismantling racism. 
Or so we can hope.  Monk’s example, however, illustrates the 
potentially high price of racial nonconformity.  Expecting Monk’s speech 
and writing to be other than they are, the characters around him are unable 
to place him socially or to assess his novels on their own terms.  Monk is 
unassimilable in contemporary American culture not because he is a black 
man able to perform the role of well-educated member of the middle class, 
but because his speech and especially his writing so fully manifest a central 
claim:  “I hardly ever think about race.   Those times when I did think about 
it a lot I did so because of my guilt for not thinking about it.  I don’t believe 
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in race” (2).  This unbelief2, this absence of attention, are simply not 
allowable—are, as Monk finds as the novel progresses, impossible.  As 
Aldon Lynn Nielsen writes in Reading Race in American Poetry:  “An Area 
of Act,” “among the many benefits of white privilege in American culture is 
the power to make race appear and disappear at will.”  As long as Monk has 
“brown skin, curly hair, wide nose and slave ancestors” (2), the social order 
requires him to believe, to be doubly conscious, to play Stagg. 
The brilliance of Erasure is that though Monk is doomed to 
frustration and insanity himself, he functions beautifully as a conduit 
through which his creator, Percival Everett, can speak.  Like Monk, Everett 
is a novelist and a professor at a prestigious university in Los Angeles; like 
Monk’s, Everett’s novels sometimes have very little to do with race.  When 
Monk demonstrates his virtuosity by running exhaustively through prose 
genres within the pages of the novel, the even greater virtuosity is Everett’s.  
Everett convinces the reader of Monk’s right to choose his own obsessions 
rather than allowing racial expectations to shape him; he makes the reader 
feel Monk’s frustration and rage.  But whereas Monk writes a scathing satire 
the irony of which is lost on publishers and mass audiences alike, Everett 
carefully situates the same satire within an illuminating context.  Whereas 
Monk’s protagonists Van Go Jenkins and Tom Wahzetepe flourish or fail 
depending upon their recognition of the racist tropes in which they are 
trapped, Everett demonstrates through Monk that the constraining, near-
invisible ironies of post-integration race politics in America can hamstring 
even well-educated, sophisticated, middle-class intellectuals.  Everett uses the 
compound form of Monk’s journal, with its mixed-genre contents, to allow 
                                                
2 Of course, the novel, obsessed on every page with racist expectations and representations, belies Monk’s 
claim not to believe.  But even Monk’s attempts not to believe provoke confusion, frustration, rage, and 
dismissal from his colleagues and acquaintances.  
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space for greater complexity and multiplicity of representation than is 
possible in any one of Monk’s individual single-genre works.   
Jordan, too, takes a compound approach to MacNolia, situating 
MacNolia’s monologues among monologues by family members and 
members of her local and national communities; he introduces a multiplicity 
of inflections and moods to the monologues in part by couching them in a 
wide variety of forms.  Many of the received-form poems in MacNolia feel 
overly constrained, too obsessed with formal perfection to break new 
ground; the five strongest, most exciting poems—those which best 
foreground language’s flexibility and opacity, its innate power—are written 
in a dictionary-entry form Jordan invents himself.  In both Erasure and 
MacNolia, virtuosity and generic exhaustion enable the authors to break free 
from old constraints and explore original territory.   The performance of 
formal mastery, that is, enables “a shift in the terms of legitimacy as an effect 
of the utterance itself”—or, put yet another way:  exhaust and escape the 
accepted ways of saying, and space will be cleared for new and potentially 
liberatory utterance. 
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“NO LONGER WHITE”:  MISCEGENATION AS RECONCILIATION 
IN FANNY HOWE’S TIS OF THEE 
 
 
Northern men, northern mothers, northern Christians, have 
something more to do than denounce their brethren at the 
South; they have to look to the evil among themselves. 
But, what can any individual do?  Of that every 
individual can judge.  There is one thing that every individual 
can do,—they can see to it that they feel right . . . the man or 
woman who feels strongly, healthily and justly, on the great 
interests of humanity, is a constant benefactor to the human 
race.  See, then, to your sympathies in this matter!  
                                  —Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin 
 
In the concluding plea of her famous 1852 anti-slavery novel Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, Harriet Beecher Stowe calls upon her readers to do everything in 
their power to end slavery and to welcome former slaves as fellow members 
of the nation.  Stowe’s insistence upon feeling as a political act has sparked 
decades of controversy. What are feelings’ material effects?  To what extent, 
and for whom, is “feeling right” enough to promote social justice?  This 
chapter uses Stowe’s writing to open questions about the usefulness and the 
pitfalls of a twenty-first-century white woman’s using affect to write about 
race.   
The issue of affect also runs through twentieth- and twenty-first 
century poetic debates about the purpose of poetry.  “Poetry is the 
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spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,” William Wordsworth writes in 
1802: “it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquility.”  
Wordsworth’s view has been at the center of the large majority of poets’ 
practices for the past two hundred years, but the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries have also produced thriving avant-gardes to whose artistic and 
literary disciplines spontaneous overflows are often irrelevant and powerful 
feelings to be handled with great care—if at all.  For many of these artists, 
poetry’s mission has more to do with re-energizing a tired, complacent world 
by defamiliarizing the tired, complacent language that constructs it.  For such 
defamiliarizing projects, the transgression and destruction of genre 
boundaries is a common and vital practice.  Ever since Gertrude Stein, poets 
have been fascinated by the shifting ground produced by generic liminality. 
How does generic liminality open up formal spaces for poetic 
representations of race?  Critical race theorist Patricia McKee describes 
literary whiteness as constructed in visual terms and literary blackness in oral 
and aural ones.  That is, McKee traces the process through which white 
characters establish and maintain their white identities by exchanging views 
and glances; she traces how black characters establish their black identities 
by talking and listening (2-5). These different sensory modes of identity 
formation raise questions about the political valences of avant-garde poetic 
projects that seek to reposition poetry’s relationship both to the visual and to 
the aural.  Specifically, Fanny Howe’s 2003 Tis of Thee—this chapter’s 
central text—presents itself simultaneously as a book of poems, an 
illustrated text, and a cd of spoken words accompanied by music. Tis of 
Thee’s simultaneous existence in visual, textual and aural forms helps Howe 
explore charged identity issues; it offers readers and auditors a range of 
affective representations and responses, potentially provoking a range of 
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personal and political action.  At the same time, the text’s multiple 
narrators—named X, Y, and Z—provide alternate identities for exploration 
and identification as they talk to, listen to, and look for one another.  
 
ABCs 
Here again, sentiment sanctions black subordination because 
affinity and desire ultimately eclipse equality. 
                                   —Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection 
 
Tis of Thee takes up Stowe’s issue of feeling right in the context of 
the segregated postbellum U.S.  Howe explores the possibilities and 
limitations of affects like empathy, intimacy, romantic passion, and familial 
affection as potential contributors to a more just and nurturing nation.  Tis 
of Thee’s representation of the difficulties of forming and sustaining a 
mixed-race American family resonates with Howe’s autobiographical 
writings about her marriage to and divorce from Carl Senna, as well as with 
the fiction and nonfiction writings of her mixed-race daughter, Danzy 
Senna.3  At the same time that Howe’s representation acknowledges affect’s 
limited power to effect social change, her characters’ focus on it may invite 
some of the same criticisms Stowe’s call has elicited from thinkers like James 
Baldwin and Lora Romero.  “Sentimentality,” writes Baldwin—that is, “the 
ostentatious parading of excessive and spurious emotion” (150)—“is the 
mark of dishonesty, the inability to feel; the wet eyes of the sentimentalist 
betray his aversion to experience, his fear of life, his arid heart; and it is 
always, therefore, the signal of secret and violent inhumanity, the mask of 
                                                
3 Fanny Howe and Carl Senna had three children, of whom Danzy Senna is the middle child.  The oldest is 
Ann-Lucien Senna or Ann-Lucien Quincy, who lives in England and is a more obscure writer than her 
sister; the youngest, visual artist Mario Senna, provided Tis of Thee’s illustrations.  
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cruelty” (150). Romero’s reading traces how Stowe’s characters’ hysterical 
emotional responses produce a radical mind-body separation that “requires 
that some people”—particularly those involved in political revolt—“be 
things” (726); “Stowe’s insistence on the mind/body binarism in her 
representation of . . . acts of resistance allows the body to suffer ‘what the 
mind needn’t feel’” (727).  Thus, for Romero, extremely emotional displays 
of resistance to slavery’s traumas can confer, in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a 
protective “inability to feel” (Baldwin), but at the price of the slave’s human 
subjectivity. 
At the same time, Romero cautions against dismissing any strategy of 
resistance too quickly or crudely: “Resistance may not transcend power 
relations altogether, but that does not mean that it merely reproduces the 
same power relations or that all power relations must reproduce the status 
quo” (730).  It is thus worth teasing out the specific logics that make 
empathy—an affective state Tis of Thee explores to its extremes—so 
slippery and double-edged.  Saidiya Hartman’s more recent critique of 
empathy as an antiracist tool focuses on a problematic model wherein “pain 
provides the common language of humanity” (18) and wherein white readers 
may mentally substitute their own bodies for black characters’.  Hartman 
pays special attention to abolitionist John Rankin’s letters to his slaveholding 
brother; in one,  
he literally narrates an imagined scenario in which he, along 
with his wife and child, is enslaved. . . .  This scenario enables 
Rankin to speak not only for but literally in the place of the 
enslaved . . . Rankin becomes a proxy and the other’s pain is 
acknowledge to the degree that it can be imagined, yet by virtue 
of  this substitution the object of identification threatens to 
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disappear. . . .  Rankin must supplant the black captive in order 
to give expression to black suffering, and as a consequence, the 
dilemma—the denial of black sentience and the obscurity of 
suffering—is not attenuated but instantiated . . . empathy fails 
to expand the space of the other but merely places the self in 
its stead.                                     (18-20) 
 
The model of empathy that Hartman critiques differs from Tis of 
Thee’s model of empathy in a few crucial respects.  First, in Hartman’s 
reading of Rankin, the affect shared through sympathy is pain.  Pain 
“extends humanity to the dispossessed and, in turn, remedies the 
indifference of the callous” (18).  But  Tis of Thee’s protagonists X and Y by 
no means limit their empathic connection to the sharing of pain.  From 
within one another’s psyches they speak of joy, wonder, humor, intellectual 
and spiritual searching:  X tells us about Y’s idea of a perfect day and how 
falling in love felt to her (14); he “joins her in” her fantasy of the country Tis 
of Thee (16); Z reports details of X’s childhood thoughts and experiences 
and of his adult reading and political thoughts, even though X and Z never 
meet in the book (20-24).  An empathy that permits only the sharing of pain 
gives a stunted vision of the other’s inner life.  Moreover, if to empathize 
means to feel pain, then the prospect of empathizing with others is a bleak 
one.  Howe’s richer model of empathy presents the more attractive prospect 
of sharing the full spectrum of another’s affects. 
Second, Hartman’s critique seems to be leveled at sentiment applied 
generally—sentiment that imagines and substitutes itself for nonspecific 
suffering black bodies.  Lora Romero points out that even Stowe’s 
somewhat problematic model privileges specific detail as a spur to political 
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change, while generalities promote complacency:  “Facts in detail, 
investigation into minutiae, absorptive vision—these can topple political 
belief and abstract theories” (729).  Howe, too, emphasizes specificity in 
naming her utopia Tis of Thee, implying care for a singular and intimate 
other (as opposed to the plural or formal you).  She simultaneously backs 
away from specificity, though, in giving her characters the anonymous 
“names” of algebraic variables (X, Y, and Z) and in leaving them unmoored 
in time.  Thus she foregrounds her characters’ synecdochal relationship to 
the larger nation:  though they are specific people suffering the 
consequences of segregation and white supremacy, they are far from alone—
they are both individuals and representatives of the nation.  The move to 
encompass both the specific and the general—both the individual and the 
nation—seems to acknowledge both the greater emotional impact of 
connection with specific individuals and the clearer insight into large, 
complex social problems provided by a bigger-picture view.  The story of the 
one family—our three protagonists—can move in time and gesture towards 
larger patters, but cannot fully address or represent the situation of the 
“collective . . . generations whose past histories were interrupted” to whom 
Howe refers in Tis of Thee’s introduction. 
Perhaps most saliently, Hartman advises suspicion of empathy that 
functions via such a substitutive logic, which by swapping bodies (as 
opposed to having bodies meet) avoids intimate encounters between people 
from different subject positions.  The affects Howe presents in Tis of Thee, 
though, are exchanged via what I call a proximity model:   specific, intimately 
connected individuals—two parents and a child—share close physical 
contact and speak as if meshed, merged.  Whereas a substitutive model of 
empathy might be satisfied by “separate but equal” logic, a proximity model 
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insists upon geographic and institutional integration. The proximity model of 
empathy requires contact and promotes intimacy; it is communicative, 
connective, moving fluidly across boundaries.   
Howe inscribes such fluidity not only on the level of characters’ 
identities, but on the level of the identity of the text itself.  Disregarding 
generic boundaries, Tis of Thee sprawls somewhere outside and among the 
neighborhoods of opera and narrative poem, dramatic triologue and science 
fiction novel.  Lineated, illustrated, set to music, and acted out, the book’s 
miscegenated literary territory maps national boundaries and intimate 
personal fantasies as it explores interracial romance struggling to take root in 
hostile territory.  The characters—X, a black man; Y, a white woman; and Z, 
their son—exist simultaneously in the nineteenth century and in the 1950s.  
The nineteenth-century time period is itself not entirely fixed:  in her 
introduction, Howe writes that the first love affair occurred “during 
Reconstruction”—that is, between 1863 and 1877—but on pages 27 and 34 
of the text, Y indicates that the affair happened in 1890.  On the one hand, 
the characters’ and events’ mobility in time is a move that recalls the 
postmodernist science fiction of feminist novelists like Joanna Russ and 
Octavia Butler—the interpenetration of consciousnesses across a span of 
more than seventy years gestures towards an anarchic empathy that violates 
even the natural laws that normally separate people.   
At the same time, though, the book’s blurring of times marks how 
very little progress the U.S. made towards full citizenship for black 
Americans during the century following their supposed emancipation.  
Referring to the way emancipation is often invoked as a radical historical 
break, Saidiya Hartman writes, “If periodization is a barrier imposed from 
above that obscures the involuntary servitude and legal subjection that 
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followed in the wake of slavery, then attempts to assert absolutist 
distinctions between slavery and freedom are untenable” (13).  If Hartman 
can suggest that black Americans who lived through emancipation 
experienced more continuity in their life conditions than is commonly 
acknowledged, then the same must be even more true for Howe’s two time 
periods that both fall between emancipation and the civil rights legislation of 
the 1950s and ‘60s.  Hartman’s caution against seeing legal steps towards 
equality as absolute, evenly applied, and even necessarily applicable to 
people’s daily lived experiences also seems appropriate as a response to 
those who contend that in the post-Civil Rights era, “racism is over.” 
Howe’s text registers a fervent, romantic, and very personal wish for a 
nation in which interpersonal relations can be kinder and more just.  The 
title country comes to us in the form of a secret offered as a gift between 
lovers:   
One day I told him a silly little secret-that when I was a child, singing 
“My Country Tis of Thee” I thought there was a secondary 
and utopian country called Tis of Thee . . . 
He didn’t laugh at me or the fantasy but instead he joined me in it 
imagining that Tis of Thee existed between the two oceans 
hovering above and pressed against 
the boundaries of Actual America.  And altruism was its only 
commandment. 
        (16) 
 
Offered up in intimacy and commanded by the boundary-dissolving 
principle of altruism, the country Tis of Thee becomes the only space in 
which these characters’ love can blossom:  in Actual America the mixed-race 
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family is in both time periods shattered by the polarizing force of white racial 
unity.  For one thing, as Y reports, “miscegenation was still a crime” in both 
of the book’s time periods (12).  For that reason, and because “her love for 
him [X] was weak in comparison with her fear of her father” (32), Y “let[s] 
each child be taken away from” her (34)—“My father,” she tells us, “came 
and made sure he was put in an appropriate place for a child like that” 
(42)—and the audio version of the text bitterly registers the disdain with 
which the white patriarch speaks those two final words.  Z reports that “she 
never wrote to tell the oysterman [that is, X] about the baby [Z himself]” 
(32).  Although she longs to, Y is ultimately too weak to contradict her 
father’s claim “that people are / like animals who always herd with their own 
kind” (12). 
For the principle of whiteness to retain its power, the text implies, the 
nation can never be of “Thee,” but must always be of “me and mine,” of 
“the line that is necessary to keep us separate and distinct from them.”  
Offering equal and interpenetrating voices to a white mother, a black father, 
and their mixed-race child, Howe’s text invests heavily in the miscegenated 
body as a figure of redemption and hope.  X refers to miscegenation as “a 
smear campaign against the homogenous” and declares, “Now, had there 
been more [interracial] fooling around, sooner, the country/ would be much 
stronger and happier” (69); Y credits Z’s fetal body with making her “darker 
and deeper” (80).  Z becomes the book’s moral authority and gets the final 
speech at its close.  But Z is also the lost, orphaned child whom Y imagines 
she must die in order to see again (85).  In so idealizing Z’s mixed status, 
Howe makes him a figure of nostalgia and impossible longing, banishing him 
to utopia, which—it must be remembered—may be the Good Place, but is 
also Noplace. 
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Tis of Thee, then, registers an ambivalent stance towards 
miscegenation, both yearning towards interracial intimacies—the proximity 
model of empathy—and “a national mixed identity” (69), and at the same 
time revealing these yearnings’ shortcomings and pitfalls when faced with 
the realities of U.S. race relations in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-
first centuries.  Howe’s characters, in their longing for utopia and for one 
another, follow Stowe’s admonition and “feel right;” in their melding of 
bodies and hearts, they likely even improve upon her call for affective 
solidarity.  But in light of X, Y, and Z’s failures and the complex experience 
of Howe’s own biographical family, this chapter must ask to what extent, 
and in what ways, miscegenation—interracial romance, the mixed-race 
family—can yield helpful metaphors for or literal means towards building a 
freer, more egalitarian nation.  The chapter considers each of the text’s three 
characters—X, Y, and Z—in turn, moving towards an explication of two 
key and interrelated issues:  What pressures do the family or reproductive 
model of the nation—and the consequent utopian desire for mixed-race 
bodies—exert upon such bodies and subjectivities?  And what does this 
text’s generic liminality contribute to its conceptions of race and the nation?  
 
X 
If the flag catch  
 fire, & an X  
 burn in, that X is Black  
 & leaves an empty space 
—Amiri Baraka, “The X Is Black” 
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Strangely for a text dedicated to fantasizing a more racially equal 
union, Tis of Thee represents X, the black man, as the character with the 
most to lose, and in some senses the least to gain, from the text’s interracial 
love affair.  Joanna Bourke quotes a 1907 article from the Afro-American: 
“Such is the condition of affairs in some communities that a Negro is almost 
afraid to meet a [white] woman on the streets or in a road after dark for fear 
that he will in some way be incriminated and possibly lynched” (102).  James 
Baldwin’s 1959 essay “Nobody Knows My Name” echoes the same terror 
around the same set of issues, juxtaposing in a single page a meditation on 
sex, family, ownership, pain, and empathy in the segregated South and the 
image of “the Southern day com[ing] up to find that black man, sexless, 
hanging from a tree!” (204).  Baldwin attributes black men’s constant peril to 
white men’s constant guilty awareness of their own interracial lust—and 
their white power to rape black women with impunity.  X knows that his 
connection with Y places him in mortal peril.  “I . . . took an insane risk 
when I talked to a white woman intimately . . . .  I knew I could be killed by 
one slip of her tongue to the wrong man,” he says (Howe 37).  And if Y is 
risky for X, then their child Z is even more so:  X says, “Pregnancy was a 
guarantee of my being lynched.” 
What, then, compels X to run such risks?  What does he hope to gain 
from intimacy with Y?  Although the access to Y’s inner emotional and 
fantasy life that X gains suggests a real connection, Howe tells us nothing of 
personal qualities that might have drawn X to Y; instead, Howe has X offer 
his awareness of the economic value of whiteness. As Cheryl Harris writes in 
“Whiteness as Property,” “Even in the early years of the [United States], it 
was not the concept of race alone that operated to oppress Blacks and 
Indians; rather, it was the interaction between conceptions of race and 
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property that played a critical role in establishing and maintaining racial and 
economic subordination” (1716).  Acknowledging the property investment 
in whiteness goes some way towards revealing the economic stakes of 
miscegenation:  marriage and the family are institutions designed for the 
maintenance and transmission of property; intermarriage is an opportunity 
not only for intimate contact between members of different races, but also 
for property and its attendant privileges to pass from white hands into black.  
To put this idea into X’s words: 
I speculated that white women could form a natural and happy 
bridge 
for the colored and the poor to escape their conditions. 
Love and marriage could be the gentlest kind of revolution 
where race and economics were leveled. 
Yet violence was the preferred course of mankind. 
(33) 
 
Tis of Thee highlights the family’s status as a nexus of intimacy (both 
affective and bodily) and property as it traces the white community’s 
investment in keeping X, Y, and Z apart.   
Throughout the text, X’s obsessive musing on industrial capitalism 
serves as the book’s index of the twined constructions of race and class.  For 
instance, he observes that “Freed slaves have been given neither shelter nor 
training./ So the nation is like a market in full operation/ resulting in ruin 
for” them (58); he attributes this state of affairs to abolitionists’ preference 
for the abstract idea of a freed slave over the specific, material specificities of 
free men and women.  He is also interested in changing technologies’ and 
mores’ relationship to gendered labor:  in the 1950s, he says, “white women 
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in particular were becoming/ their own servants and slaves, as if wicked 
histories had returned to haunt and/ possess them in their one lifetime” (33).  
Speaking closely focalized through X’s point of view, Z discusses the United 
States’s transition from Reconstruction to the Gilded Era: 
It was, for people like him, a time of terrible trial. 
After the end of slavery, the economy gained momentum like 
something freed  
from the controls of law and ethics.  Now greed increased like a 
lurching wheel 
on a down curve. . . . 
Measure for measure, money eliminated a concept of value based in 
physical 
quality. 
 
After the Civil War . . . people rushed by sucking, 
sweeping, pushing, retreating, contracting, pulsing, eyeing, eyes as 
periscopes, 
crystal balls and bubbles, myriad-made, implicit, insistent, variegated, 
spirit- 
members managed, produced, distributed 
and there was no attention or shelter for the weak, the chicks. 
Owners were too busy wondering: 
Who is longest?  Who is fat?  Who is cheapest? 
Who is best?  Who is measuring? 
What’s my credit?  What’s my debt?                                                                  
(39) 
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Though X is not likely to take up the Lost Cause position that such anti-
industrial, anticapitalist nostalgia reveals the superiority of the antebellum 
plantation system, he does insist that human beings’ attention has become 
monopolized by the market to the exclusion of care for “physical quality,” 
an idea that could encompass both the lovingly created products of 
unalienated labor and the intimately known, proximal, individual other 
human being—someone a person might converse with, love, or even quarrel 
with as opposed to simply appraising in economic terms.  Also excluded is a 
sense of socially just power relations which would offer “attention or shelter 
for the weak, the chicks.” 
 In X’s anticapitalist vision, “American lawns green and shaved in the 
suburbs/ call to mind the last stages of rhymed verse . . . / poor leads to 
war”—that is, the bourgeoisie surround themselves with conformist 
comforts, but their privilege is founded upon a growing material inequality 
that makes violence inevitable.  No wonder X jumps at Y’s vision of the 
utopian country Tis of Thee.  He recalls it, in later years, as an anti-bourgeois 
paradise. 
 I remember that in Tis of Thee there were no guns, no bombs, no 
poisons. 
We made it into a quiet place, rising from old waste-heaps, and the 
basins of 
sewage plants. 
Just as the knuckles of trees underground can burst open the 
pavement,  
given time, so this strange little place, given patience, might also 
overcome.   
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(87) 
 
Like Y, who pictures the country as made up of “a series of 
unattached railroad cars occupied by derelicts” (16), X envisions the 
country Tis of Thee as a non-violent haven for bourgeois society’s 
unmarketable waste.  But X goes further to imagine Tis of Thee 
slowly, organically rising from below to retake the nation from those 
obsessed with wealth.  For him, Tis of Thee is not a personal haven, 
but a humbler, kinder vision of the future for us all. 
X’s economic obsession insistently reminds the reader that Tis of 
Thee’s narrative illustrates not just a failed romance, but—more to the 
point—a failed redistributive fantasy. X believes that Y may share his dream 
of redistributing her white wealth:  “She came forward first, of course,” X 
says of Y, “as if offering her body bravely as a / sacrifice to history.  And I 
believed that she, being white and privileged,/ knew what she was doing” 
(37).  With the knowledge of hindsight, the grown child Z reports of his 
father, “Embarrassed that he had actually hoped she might lead him to a 
more  / secure life he was finally just glad that he had survived the contact at 
all” (50).  X ends the book old, sad, and alone, apparently powerless—
despite his reading and his endless, compelling philosophizing—to found a 
family, to feel at home in the world, to anchor himself anywhere. 
Despite X’s inability to save or change himself, he does offer 
something very valuable to Y:  his interaction with her provides an 
invaluable model for Y’s change of feelings over the course of the text.  
Never taking his own identity or subjectivity for granted, X is in Tis of Thee 
always already empathically aligned with Y—a position that resonates clearly 
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with the passage in which W. E. B. DuBois lays out his concept of double 
consciousness.  “This American world,” Du Bois writes, “yields him no true 
self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of 
the other world.  It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this 
sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others.”  The 
doubly conscious person is conscious of himself always as subject and 
object—spectator and spectacle—simultaneously. Such an empathic 
alignment of points of view characterizes the utopian experience of love and 
intimacy that Fanny Howe represents in Tis of Thee.   
Throughout the book, the characters—although physically separated 
from one another—speak for one another and from one another’s most 
private inner experiences.  For instance, the book’s second monologue 
describes Y’s internal, subjective experience of falling in love—“like having a 
slippery whale shoot / through her fingers”—but the speaker who is privy to 
“her idea of a perfect day” and to the fact that love “made her remember her 
feet bleeding / from sharp shells curtained in mud” is not Y herself, but X 
(14).  X reports that it “made her hard to be so happy,” and that when they 
fell in love, Y was “still like a boy in / trunks.”  Not only does X report the 
imaginative interior experience of love from a position within Y’s psyche, his 
descriptions of her sound distinctly male—as if she were indistinguishable 
from himself.  Just as Du Bois describes, X—a black man—is conscious for 
and of both himself and the white Y.  And yet this is not the experience of, 
in Du Bois’s words, “measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks 
on in amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois 694); the double consciousness 
X practices with Y is instead a generous and joyful, if extremely vulnerable, 
intimacy. 
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But does Y take full advantage of X’s generously empathic example?  
Her consciousness does change over the course of the book, as we will see 
in the next section.  However, she never attains the level of empathic 
mobility of consciousness that X and Z perform.  X is able to report Y’s 
inner thoughts and experiences and Z is able to report X’s, but Y never 
completes the circle and tells us about Z’s inner world.  Thus, the mixed 
child never receives the same admiring, sympathetic attention that his 
parents do in this text; and the white mother may never really attain double 
consciousness. 
 
Y 
Wise, why’s, y’s 
                                                                          —Amiri Baraka 
 
In her book Visible Identities, Linda Martín Alcoff advocates the 
development of a white double consciousness—but instead of the 
DuBoisian sense of doubled perspective that leads one empathetically to 
subjectify others even as one is objectified oneself, Alcoff believes that “for 
whites, double consciousness requires an ever-present acknowledgement of 
the historical legacy of white identity constructions in the persistent 
structures of inequality and exploitation, as well as a newly awakened 
memory of the many white traitors to white privilege who have struggled to 
contribute to the building of an inclusive human community” (223).  The 
text itself displays an ambivalent relationship to history:  though it dwells 
obsessively upon racial, gender, and economic injustices, Tis of Thee’s 
murky, messy blending of time periods suggests an historical sense more 
intuitive than intentional.  In any case, Y herself—who is aware that she is 
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“stamped throughout [her] cells/ with the United States Service” (31) and 
who wonders whether “in an earlier life” she was “a cruel mistress to slaves 
and their children” (19)—invests herself heavily in the identity of a “traitor 
to white privilege.” 
Early in the text and in their romance, Y shares with X that she sees 
herself as an outsider to the nation of which she is a citizen:  “I thought 
there was a secondary / and utopian country called Tis of Thee that 
belonged to me / and a few others.  I imagined this country as a nation of 
outcasts— / outside history—like a series of railroad cars occupied by 
derelicts” (Howe 16).  Y identifies with derelicts, people with no property at 
all; she aligns herself with “outcasts” and those “outside history;” later, X 
and Y declare together, “If you are guided by love, you are always outside 
the law!” (49-50).  “Outside the law” is precisely the phrase Thomas 
Jefferson used in his draft of race laws for Virginia to describe “any black 
freedman or freedwoman or any white woman who had given birth to a 
black or mulatto child and remained in the commonwealth for more than a 
year” (Thandeka); had his laws taken effect, the life of any such person 
would have been forfeit. 
White supremacy’s deep investment in parents—especially white 
mothers—who produce racially pure children makes more sense in light of 
Shirley Samuels’s description of republican motherhood as constructed in 
early American literature.  “In the historical romance,” she writes, “questions 
of political and national identity become attached to female bodies, and a 
national subject is formed through the coordination of citizenship and family 
ideology” (19).  If the national identity is segregated and white supremacist, 
then Y’s production of black heirs to her white wealth is traitorous.  “The 
pressure in these discourses is . . . to produce . . . a national body and a 
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national family that could reproduce that body” (Samuels 19).  In gestating 
Z’s mixed race body and longing to raise him together with X and according 
to their anticapitalist values, Y is actively engaged in building an alternative 
nation—the country Tis of Thee—and thus in sedition against a state 
modeled upon the white bourgeois family.  To paraphrase the motto of Race 
Traitor magazine, “loyalty to humanity is treason to whiteness”—and the 
stakes of treason are inevitably high. 
 Although Y is not, in fact, killed for her affair with X or for the birth 
of Z, she does sacrifice a great deal.  Howe uses Y to explore the extent to 
which members of the racial elect are vulnerable to falling from grace.  Y’s 
infraction of racial codes is clear, but the consequences—though dire—are 
inconsistent, shifting, and difficult to articulate.  Even after Y submits to her 
tyrannical white father’s demand that she give Z up for adoption, he still 
disowns her; she spends the rest of her life in various institutions, regarded 
as unfit to care for herself or possibly insane, and in her 1950s incarnation 
undergoes shock treatments.  In effect, it seems, she is stripped of much of 
the comfort and status she formerly enjoyed as a middle-class white woman.   
Y muses, “If ‘white’ means that nothing has happened to a particular 
body / to disrupt its ancestral history; / if whiteness means extreme 
individualism, I was no longer white” (71).  As in Patricia McKee’s model, 
blackness is forged in dialogue and community; autonomy is the privilege of 
the racial elite.  And later in the text, “If you are white / and have carried a 
baby who is not, that baby’s body / becomes one with your own and you are 
darker and deeper for it” (80).  Y claims to be what she calls “a dark one 
budding from inside the skin” (67), and if Nella Larsen’s take on the issue is 
any indication, perhaps Y is right.  During a scene in Passing in which a 
white man makes racist comments to three women he is unaware are black, 
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Larsen’s protagonist notes, “It was . . . unbelievable and astonishing that 
four people could sit so unruffled, so ostensibly friendly, while they were in 
reality seething with anger, mortification, shame.  But no, on second thought 
she was forced to amend her opinion.  John Bellew, most certainly, was as 
undisturbed within as without” (174).  Here, whiteness is 
unselfconsciousness; whiteness is the luxury of behaving outwardly in a 
manner consistent with one’s internal thoughts.  Y has lost that luxury and 
many of the comforts of whiteness, such as her bourgeois feminine 
“birthright with its clear glass tables/ in livingrooms—except where the 
cocktail left a circle—or the peanut a shower/ of salt” (Howe 34).  But she 
has received as compensation a new perspective on the world—the 
stereoscopic vision of double consciousness—along with a sense of moral 
justification, a feeling of being on the right side of history. 
However, Y is aware that others still read her as white.  “Assumptions 
were made by on-lookers,” she says; “You are a white one who is just like 
us?”  As Alcoff points out, “whites cannot completely disavow whiteness or 
distance themselves from their white identity.  One’s appearance of being 
white will still operate to confer privilege in numerous and significant ways, 
and to avow treason does not render whites ineligible for these privileges, 
even if they work hard to avoid them” (215).4 Y’s personal renunciation of 
whiteness is at best too little, too late.  She has already abandoned her 
mixed-race child, orphaning her longed-for embodiment of a racially united 
future nation.  Worse, to avow race treason may even be just another 
                                                
4 Much of Howe’s daughter Danzy Senna’s work—in essays and in her novels Caucasia and Symptomatic—
deals with the deep and real pain that accompanies the privilege accrued by subjects who experience 
themselves as nonwhite but whose bodies are read as white by onlookers.  Such subjects, in Senna’s 
experience, tend to become undercover witnesses to slurs against themselves.  Perhaps it is the experience 
of this pain that most reliably distinguishes, within an apparently white exterior, a truly nonwhite or doubly 
conscious subjectivity from one merely enjoying the righteousness or cachet of avowing race treason. 
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exercise in white arrogance:  as Aldon Lynn Nielsen points out, “among the 
many benefits of white privilege in American culture is the power to make 
race appear and disappear at will.” 
Ultimately, both the abandoned lover X and the abandoned child Z 
find Y’s avowal of race treason—her feeling right—ambiguously valuable, 
both radical and insufficient.  After years of searching for one another, X 
and Y finally catch a glimpse of one another outside a Boston public toilet 
on a rainy or sleety Sunday.  Y feels herself still bound to X, yet also bound 
to his retroactive absence:  “like a spinster on a widow’s walk, who watches 
the empty sea,/ I felt the air and the rain between us/ as a chain that would 
never disappear” (93).  Even as the air and weather permanently bind the 
lovers, Y watches X and watches for X like a widow—but also like a 
spinster, a woman who has never married.  Despite the connection she feels, 
she also feels both that she has lost X and that she never had him.   
From X’s point of view, this encounter is the final failure of his and 
Y’s experiment in empathic intimacy.   
I started to call out when I realized that my absence from the place  
where she was actually standing  
would make my voice a waste. 
So I got back into my truck and drove away 
into the billows of sleet.  I was afraid.                                      (92) 
 
Even though X and Y are close enough to see and hear one another, 
X feels that Y is not sufficiently “standing in the same place” as him to hear 
his voice.  That is:  for X, Y’s subject position is still too alien for her to 
understand him, no matter how he might try to reach her.  Their empathy is 
somehow not proximal enough.  And yet, X—honestly?  gallantly?—does 
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not place the blame for this situation entirely upon Y:  he acknowledges that 
he retreats because he is afraid. 
X also claims the absence between them:  not “her absence from the 
place where I was standing” but “my absence from the place/ where she 
was.”  Such an ascribing of absence to the black party signals a shift from a 
model common in American literature that registers blackness as marked and 
whiteness as blank, empty.  Howe describes this model in X’s speech on 
page 37: 
The moon is what is seen by the light of the sun. 
 
So whiteness is what is dependent on a witness. 
The moon’s opaque and egg-like sheen is the kind of zero  
that wants to be more than air and negativity. 
This zero wants to be counted as one of the numbers. 
Likewise the moon is a blank whole, instead of a black hole. 
It makes us believe that the sky is as solid as whatever is in it. 
 
In X’s account here, whiteness may yearn towards inclusion in a larger 
human community, but it is also “a blank whole,” a body that claims 
universal neutrality, a self-satisfied and un-self-critical mass as unflappable as 
Larsen’s John Bellew.  It is the free American citizen who requires a foil—a 
slave, an impoverished sharecropper, a body subject to imprisonment and 
lynching—in order to understand itself as free.   
Finding this examination of whiteness in the context of a book of 
poems presented both visually and aurally prompts me to question the 
ending of Charles Bernstein’s otherwise wonderful article, “Hearing Voices,” 
on aural presentation as foregrounding poetry’s materiality.  Bernstein writes,  
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Recognizing that a poem is not one but many, that sound and sense 
are as much at odds as ends, makes the study of poetry’s sound a test 
case for midrashic antinomianism, a new approach to critical studies 
that I am launching here . . . 
Which is to say, to come to some conclusions 
A work of art always exceeds its material constructions 
As well as its idealizations Physical or digital instantiations 
Anterior codes or algorithmic permutations 
Experiences while reading or viewing are no more than weigh 
stations 
And any number of interpretations, contexts of publications, 
historical connections— 
All these have a charmed affinity 
Clustering around a center that is empty. 
That empty center or blank space is the possibility of freedom.      148 
 
While I can agree without reservation that spaces of undecidability or 
interpretive unorthodoxy—what I take Bernstein to mean by “midrashic 
antinomianism”—feel liberatory, I am anxious about calling such spaces 
blank or empty.  For one thing, I wonder whether celebrating emptiness 
might simply further fetishize a condition associated with cultural whiteness?  
Besides, if what excites us about poetry presented in multiple forms or 
through multiple performances is its excess—the ways in which it “exceeds 
its material constructions”—then the center around which interpretations 
and contexts cluster would seem not to be empty at all but, like an 
astronomical black hole, infinitely full and yet still able to accommodate 
more.  In that case, Bernstein’s celebration of the multiplicity of poetic 
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readings (“readings” in both senses:  performances, interpretations)—
complete with the image of “any number of interpretations, contexts of 
publications, historical connections” clustering around a space of “possibility 
of freedom”—suggests that although readings and bodies are invariably 
marked, those marks are also always in motion, unfixed and unfixable.  To 
read identity in such a way certainly allows subjects space in which to act 
counter or even sideways to racial and class norms. 
For Z’s part, he finds the newly racially aware Y to be on the one 
hand “a new creation, / a completely unknown quantity, an equalizer / who 
can’t be incorporated into the social body, a citizen / who is a witness to all 
sides of history” (82).  Z describes Y in yearning utopian terms, making her 
doubly conscious white body sound much more radical even than Z’s own 
mixed one.  The passivity and internality of this radical change, though, 
undercut its power to effect social change.  “Everyone outside / continues 
to see you as white all the way through,” Z observes.  “Too bad you didn’t 
take action.” 
 
Z  
She referred to him as “your father” and he to her as “your 
mother” so that we children became owners of the problem. 
                   —Danzy Senna, Where Did You Sleep Last Night? 
 
 Z is of course right not to see himself—a mixed-race orphan—as a 
new phenomenon in American history.  As X muses, “Since the country was 
founded, there has been racial mixing by rape and by / choice, by marriage 
and by fornication” (69).  Even though this miscegenation—quoting X 
again—“has acted as a kind of politics of / infiltration—a smear campaign 
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against the homogenous,” X acknowledges that it has not been “quite 
enough to successfully achieve a national mixed identity.” U. S. customs 
such as the law under slavery that the child should follow the condition of 
the mother or the Jim Crow era’s one-drop rule have functioned to shore up 
a binary racial system that works to deny, erase, and orphan the mixed 
bodies who have always constituted living evidence of interracial intimacy. 
 “Isn't an ‘American Negro’ multiracial by definition?” Margaret Kent 
Bass asks on her blog, Writin’ Black from the Academy.   
Over the years, increasing numbers of students with various 
shades of brown skin have loudly proclaimed: ‘I'm not black; 
I'm biracial.’ . . . Let me just give you my initial reaction when I 
hear someone tell me this: Okay, you're obviously not white. 
We see that . . . So why does your need to tell me that you're 
not black feel like a rejection of me? If we can see that you're 
not white, what drives you to tell us that you're not black? 
 
Fanny Howe’s daughter Danzy Senna goes some way towards answering 
Bass’s question in her essay “The Mulatto Millennium.” “Call yourself mixed 
and you just might find the world shines a little brighter on you,” Senna 
writes;  “Pure breeds (at least the black ones) are out and hybridity is in.  
America loves us in all our half-caste glory . . . Major news magazines 
announce our arrival as if were proof of extraterrestrial life.  They claim 
we’re going to bring about the end of race as we know it” (430, 429).  
Despite X’s announcement that “racial mixing” has been part of our 
bioculture “since the country was founded” (69), Tis of Thee picks up on 
just the tone of millennial utopianism that Senna mocks—less in its content 
than in its structural positioning of Z as both the lost and desired object for 
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whom both parents search and as the text’s final moral arbiter, speaker of its 
final speech, representative of the younger generation and thus of the 
nation’s reproductive futurity.  
 Despite Z’s status as the desirable embodiment of utopian America, 
the fact is that his parents do not raise him but leave him to join the other 
“children—social orphans—[who] on stone-dented buses/ have traveled the 
breadth of this city, joggling and pressing/ at each other like mobs of 
unwanteds/ who will only too soon struggle in a kind of mutual suicide 
pact” (84).  Z shares this orphaned status with X, who was also given up by 
his mother and raised at “The Home for Little Wanderers, an orphanage” 
(24).  In fact, X and Z are so closely aligned that on one page we learn that Y 
is pregnant with Z and the next begins, “He was born . . .,” but the “he” in 
question is X (19-20).  X and Z are joined in orphanhood just as Howe’s 
daughter imagines that she and her father might have been:   
 “I never knew back then that he’d spent a portion of his childhood in an 
orphanage, but I sensed that to ally myself with him would be to orphan 
myself” (Where Did You Sleep 182).  As X gazes at the hospital “for 
wayward women” to which he has traced Y, he “hold[s his] heart/ that had 
already been assigned to an adoption agency once,/ and I couldn’t bear 
imagining my child’s heart suffering the same fate./  But of course he did. 
Suffer it.  His half-caste heart all lost heart, gone” (62).  X grieves for the 
orphanhood he shares with Z—a state of loss and grief produced by 
segregation and white supremacy, which make black Americans the orphans 
of the national family.  Z muses, “It is said that the Messiah will not come 
until the tears of Esau are exhausted./ Until Hagar’s tears are wipes from her 
face and she is welcomed home,/ there will be no peace” (68).  In other 
words, Paradise or utopia will be achieved when the rejected members of the 
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family regain their rightful places; the United States will become Tis of Thee 
when it learns to nurture its nonwhite citizens. 
 One reason why the multiracial body, despite its high status in twenty-
first-century U.S. culture, has little revolutionary potential by itself is 
precisely because of its utopian cachet in our post-civil-rights-era 
consciousness—and because consumer capitalism is so good at co-opting 
utopian dreams into the service of entertainment and advertising.  In her 
satirical essay “The Mulatto Millennium,” Senna strikes to the heart of the 
matter:  “All this celebration of mixture felt to me like a smoke screen, really, 
obscuring the fundamental issue of racism, and for that matter, class 
divisions.  It seemed to me we spent so much time talking about kimchee 
and grits, we forgot to talk about power” (434).  Nothing sells expensive 
sportswear like that “fetishized object, an exotic bird soaring above the racial 
landscape” (439)—that is, a happy, unproblematic mixed body amnesic of 
the histories of power and domination his gleaming smile distracts from.  
“Everyone’s money is good here, see?  Racism is over!” proclaims the post- 
Civil Rights Era shopping-mall billboard. 
This mad rush to “the end of blackness”—and the sense of betrayal 
both Senna and Bass describe on the part of those who do identify as 
black—springs from the highly contentious history of blackness in the 
United States and the antibourgeois polemicism of the Black Power 
movement.  To flaunt one’s mixedness—to “take back the white,” as Senna 
jokes that the newly fashionable “Mulatto Nation” advocates—is to 
highlight just how assimilable blackness in fact is to the bourgeois consumer 
culture that, in the U.S., dwells at the heart of and sometimes feels 
synonymous with whiteness.  Senna writes that she “sneered at those 
byproducts of miscegenation who chose to identify as mixed, not black.  I 
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thought it wishy-washy, an act of flagrant assimilation, treason, passing 
even” (431).  She writes of the “danger in this muddy middle stance.  A 
danger of disappearing.  Of being swallowed whole by the great white 
whale” (433). Senna’s image of whiteness devouring difference resonates 
with the colonial Australian project of “breeding out the colour” that 
resulted in that country’s Stolen Generations during roughly the same period 
as the century between Emancipation and Civil Rights in the United States.  
Here in the country that produced Ralph Ellison’s invisible man, to work for 
real interracial reconciliation and true integration (as opposed to assimilation) 
is to embrace the visibility of “a people bonded not by shared complexion or 
hair texture but by shared history,” as Senna describes black people (431).  
Because of Americans’ long history of racial binarism, we have trouble 
perceiving the mixedness of mixed-race bodies.  They resemble one group or 
another.  They blend in—and are orphaned from the radical barrier-
crossings that produced them. 
 Unorphaned and highly visible, though, is the intact mixed-race 
family.  Within it, interracial intimacy, exchange, trust,  and mutual aid are 
not fleeting, as in X and Y’s brief encounter, but ongoing.  The intact mixed 
family represents a constantly renewed commitment to proximity; this is the 
commitment X and especially Y fail to make.  Despite her divorce from Carl 
Senna, an anecdote from Fanny Howe’s own life illustrates what she herself 
has done—if not perfectly—then at least better than her characters.  Danzy 
Senna writes, “My mother, trying to downplay the extent of the damage” 
done by her parents’ divorce and her father’s irregular involvement in her 
life, “made this strange comment to me from time to time:  ‘You never had a 
father.  He was more of a big brother to you.’  [I remember] me one day 
correcting her:  ‘No, Mummy, everyone has a father.  He was the father I 
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got’” (Where Did You Sleep 26).  On the one hand, this anecdote 
illustrates—in a protective parental context—Howe’s privileged white 
impulse to rewrite history, to retrospectively assign normative identities; 
Senna, speaking from her black-identified mixed position, reminds her 
mother that she has no right to do so.  In preserving a relationship with her 
children (and even her ex-husband), Howe has maintained an ongoing 
mixed-race conversation in which voices of different races can argue; Senna 
has the opportunity to hear and correct her mother’s version of the family’s 
history.   
Since Y gives away Z, they have no such opportunity for ongoing 
dialogue.  They have no opportunity to get to know one another at all, and 
as a result, the character Z—despite his utopian promise and moral authority 
in the text—is barely a character in his own right.  We learn nothing of his 
biography or personality beyond the way he reports his parents’ story.  Thus, 
the intimately associated, assorted bodies of the intact mixed-race family—
unrealized in Tis of Thee—are what would represent the new, the 
unassimilable, the revolutionary because of their ongoing proximity, their 
relationship, their intimate knowledge of one another not as symbols, but as 
people.  They would not need ask, as Y does of X, “Did I even love this 
man, whom I hardly knew, whom I was forbidden to know?/ Who was he?” 
(19).  X and Y get to know one another—and especially Z—only as symbols 
of nostalgia and hope, never as complex individuals with human needs and 
desires.  To quote the mixed child of the failed family at the heart of Senna’s 
novel Caucasia, “They should have stuck together.  They should have tried 
harder” (407). 
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Tis of Z:  The Textual Child 
 
Thou ill-formed offspring of my feeble brain, 
Who after birth didst by my side remain . . . 
If for thy father asked, say thou hadst none; 
And for thy mother, she alas is poor, 
Which caused her thus to send thee out of door. 
—Anne Bradstreet, “The Author to Her Book” 
 
Where X and Y have failed, Howe has in some ways succeeded in the 
body of the book itself.  In the New England poetess tradition of Anne 
Bradstreet’s “The Author to Her Book,” Howe offers a textual body that is 
the body of the child:  an uncategorizeable text that sometimes sings 
effortlessly across genres and sometimes jumbles them into awkward 
juxtapostion.  In the best tradition of experimental art, Tis of Thee gropes 
towards an insight it cannot yet quite articulate as argument, but which it can 
untidily and partially embody.  In its multigenre form as well as its 
miscegenation plot, Tis of Thee advocates and undertakes a project of mixed 
speaking:  its characters communicate across the color line, of course, and at 
times speak as racially mixed, ambiguous, or unstable subjects.  But I 
imagine Tis of Thee as most radically suggesting speaking towards a more 
empathic and just nation by always addressing the other as (at least 
potentially) mixed. 
In nineteenth-century sentimental literature, the beautiful mulatto 
who learns of her black ancestry only when she becomes subject to sale as a 
slave is a common tragic trope.  The implication is clear:  not only do the 
horrors of slavery happen to people who look like you, O genteel white 
 81 
reader—they could happen to you personally. Taking mixedness and 
contingency of identity rather than whiteness as the neutral, presumptive 
identity of the generic American would be a radically liberatory move 
indeed—the dismantling of compulsory whiteness could do for race what 
the dismantling of compulsory heterosexuality promises for sexual identity.  
If white were no longer “neutral,” it would have a hard time remaining 
central.  Still, framing this presumptive mixedness as “of thee” rather than 
“of me”—“I am likely speaking to a mixed subject” rather than “I likely am 
a mixed subject”—sidesteps some of the pitfalls Danzy Senna and Aldon 
Lynn Neilsen raise with regard to multiracial chic and the white privilege of 
invoking or dispelling race at will.  (As Senna writes, “Cultural Mulatto:  Any 
American born post-1967.  See Wiggers.” “Mulatto” 432)  Experiencing the 
self as mixed invokes a substitutive model of racial empathy in which the 
righteous self displaces the other; assuming that the other is mixed invokes a 
proximity model in which concern and sensitivity are directed outwards 
towards the other in order to strengthen interpersonal bonds.  As we have 
seen, substitution threatens to erase the very subjects with whom it 
empathizes, while proximity dissolves borders, promotes fluidity and 
connection.  In a substitutive model of empathy, the empathizer turns 
inwards towards her own imagination, visualizing the other’s experience; in a 
proximity model, she must turn instead towards the other, paying attention, 
listening. 
 Tis of Thee embodies its project of mixed speaking formally in its 
physical presentation:  a book of poems interspersed with nonverbal visual 
art and accompanied by a cd.  Tis of Thee invites its audience to experience 
it visually—as Patricia McKee describes as central to white experience; it also 
invites us to experience it aurally—as McKee describes as central to black 
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experience. To address a text’s physical presentation is to consider how 
audiences will interact with it, and thus what kind of intervention it can make 
into their experiences of the world. We read, look, visualize, mentally 
substitute ourselves for the characters; we listen to the characters and 
musicians as separate from, yet vocally and instrumentally present to, 
ourselves.   “I . . . see aurality and writing not as indicating separate domains 
but as suggesting a bodily response to certain literary possibilities,” N. 
Katherine Hayles writes; by presenting the two together (along with 
illustrations), Tis of Thee invites a range of bodily responses. 
 Take, for instance, the text’s final illustration, which faces Z’s final 
pronouncement as the text’s moral arbiter (94-95).  Mario Senna’s image 
here, as in much of the book, seems too small even to take full advantage of 
the book’s small pages.  A square of about two inches by two inches, this 
small patch of swirling grays is bisected vertically by a line across which 
values are inverted:  what would be darkest on the left is lightest on the right.  
But I recognize this effect—as I recognize the human face the illustration 
presents—only because by now, the text has trained me to see it.  This 
picture reminds me that on page 38, Senna has presented a grayscale group 
portrait; a black woman in a white nineteenth-century-style dress stands to 
the side of a group of children whose races I cannot determine.  The image 
is blurry, low-resolution, like a pixilated photograph or a painting made with 
an awkwardly large brush.  Slightly off-center, a vertical stripe of value 
inversion runs down the image, showing only that piece of the picture in 
negative.  Still, the image of a woman with a group of children is familiar 
enough; this illustration is easy to recognize, especially if I hold the book at 
arm’s length and squint a little.  That gesture, optional for viewing the image 
on page 38, becomes necessary for the one on page 95.  Only because all of 
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the other illustrations in the book have been representational—most images 
of human beings—does it occur to me to relax my eyes’ focus and see the 
swirl of positive-negative grays in this little square for the human face it is—
a portrait of Z, or of his final declaration:  “Celebration./ A life of pure 
contradiction.”  I must perform physical work to interpret this portrait, and 
still I am left having to admit that I cannot be certain precisely what I am 
looking at. 
 Y speaks in Tis of Thee of her suspicion of visual representations, 
those central elements, in McKee’s model, of autonomous white 
subjecthood: 
Now I believe that when the Messiah comes the world will 
have no images, 
since the image will be cut free 
from the object, released like beef from a cow, 
and competition will automatically founder 
as an instinct, having no visible object in sight. 
Then on that day I won’t have to look for you in order to know 
you.                                                                           (61)                   
                                                                                                           
The analogy of images free of objects like beef free of cows is an odd image 
of Paradise.  For one thing, in the ages of mechanical and digital 
reproduction—of print, television, and internet advertising—images are 
already reduplicated and disseminated much more freely than their objects.  
Given special effects technologies—becoming more sophisticated all the 
time, but present from the birth of photography—no object is even 
necessary for an image to be produced.  So images are already free for 
distribution and consumption, just as factory-farmed beef is readily available 
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for city- and suburb-dwellers who have never been in the presence of a live 
cow.  The lines “competition will automatically founder/ as an instinct, 
having no visible object in sight” suggest that freely circulating 
commodities—images and beef—are just the opposite of what Y means, 
though.  No visible objects of competition:  Y is describing an anticapitalist 
utopia like X’s.  It’s not the images or the beef Y values; it’s the objects and 
the cows.  In a Paradise free from commodities and the images that drive 
consumer markets, Y imagines that human connection will become 
somehow automatic as well as authentic—that she will no longer need to 
search for X or Y, but will somehow find them already near her, available 
not for purchase but for intimacy. 
 Print text, of course, is also often deployed in advertising; text’s 
illusion of transparent communication lends itself all too easily—in the 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poetry critique—to commodity fetishism and 
alienation of labor.  However, text’s relationship to visuality and aurality is 
different both from pictorial images’ and from audible sound’s.  “We read,” 
Hayles writes, “in the body, particularly in the vocal apparatus that produces 
subvocalization during silent reading” (74).  Our bodily response to text—
subvocalization—creates an oral and aural component for a medium that 
might at first seem purely visual.  Moreover, reading’s oral/aural component 
dovetails with readers’ own ongoing self-production processes.  “Reading is 
akin to the interior monologue that we all engage in, except that it supplies 
us with another story (usually a more interesting one) than that we 
manufacture for ourselves to assure ourselves we exist” (Hayles 75).  
Reading printed text, then, becomes a site for alternative subject 
production—and thus, a potential locus for change and liberation.  As 
Hayles points out, “Drama produces and is produced through bodies 
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physically present onstage.  Sound comes not through subvocalization but 
directly through the auditory channel” (79).  Thus, strangely, Tis of Thee 
may not have the same potentially life-changing force for those who 
experience it as an aural performance as for those whose silent reading and 
subvocalization stage the text themselves, in their own voices. 
 Tis of Thee’s presentation as recorded sound also foregrounds two 
intertwined problems for the recorded, preserved, disembodied voice as a 
guide to racial utopia.  For one thing, just as Patricia McKee links white 
subject formation with visuality and autonomous individualism, so she links 
black subject formation with aurality and “media of social response” (3).  In 
Tis of Thee Howe expresses a hope that people might become doubly 
conscious, empathic through proximity and intimacy, by learning to 
experience the world in a less individualistic—a less white—way.  Such a 
hope resonates nicely with McKee’s description of black identity “produced 
in exchanges that occur among more often than within characters.  Media of 
call-and-response, for example, instead of authorizing extensions of 
individualism, express a responsiveness among persons that is understood to 
move social exchange beyond the bounds of individual consciousness” (5).  
The imperative seems clear:  produce the self in a less visual and more aural 
way, and thereby become more responsive, other- and community-centered.  
The recorded voice, however, threatens this model:  it is a voice to which 
one cannot answer back, a voice one cannot engage in conversation.  As 
Charles Bernstein points out, “Listening to such recordings, we hear . . . a 
voice that we can hear but that cannot hear us” (144).  Listening to the 
speech of others present, we connect with the speakers, engage in social 
rituals, answer back.  Listening to recorded speech, we remain passive, alone. 
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 This one-way quality of interaction with the recorded voice brings me 
to the other difficulty with the power dynamic between auditor and recorded 
speaker: its structural similarity to the power dynamic between viewer and 
viewed.  As we saw in Robyn Wiegman’s description of both spectacle and 
surveillance models, disciplinary power inheres mostly on the side of the 
viewer; both spectacular and surveilled bodies are disempowered because 
they are the objects of gazes they cannot return.  Thus these bodies, these 
subjects, must work to reproduce performances with difference, 
inconsistency, or subterfuge in order to generate liberatory space between 
themselves and the normalizing forces acting upon them.  Using Richard 
Nixon’s Oval Office tapes as an example, Michael Davidson shows that 
unlike voices in real-time conversation, recorded voices share the 
disempowered position of spectacular and especially surveilled bodies. 
“The technologies that contained the voice of subversives and opponents 
also trapped the one running the machine . . . in a world where presence is 
increasingly verified by information storage and retrieval” (Davidson 103).  
Although Davidson shows how surveyor can become surveilled, he also 
makes clear that in a surveillance model, listening is power.  To speak and be 
recorded is to become othered, the voice now fixed in a technological “gaze” 
and subject to the expectations and disciplinary action of the listener. 
 Despite the complex power dynamics embodied in audio recording as 
a form, Davidson and Bernstein also offer insight into the ways in which 
audible—as opposed to printed—poetry highlights specificity, materiality, 
and affect, thus furthering Howe’s project of exploring power and 
positionality.  For one thing, just as the book’s illustrations appeal wordlessly 
to viewers’ emotions with their dauby, out-of-focus family portraits and 
children’s-book-like line drawings of cows, the cd’s musical accompaniment 
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to the spoken text orchestrates listeners’ emotions.  The patriotic standard 
“My Country Tis of Thee” is repeatedly invoked and then deformed, 
twisting away into odd, unfamiliar minor modes that trouble our easy 
familiarity with this music. 
Contrasting spoken to print poetry, Davidson writes, “Orality signifies 
unmediated access to passional states, giving testimony to that which only 
this poet could know” (97); music is widely held, too, to bear a direct 
relationship to affective states.  On the Tis of Thee cd, string, brass, and 
woodwind parts run the gamut from stately to playful to mournful as the 
dramatic reading progresses, cuing listeners’ emotional responses much as a 
film score would. 
 Moreover, as Charles Bernstein emphasizes, aural presentation 
preserves materialities that text doesn’t transmit, highlighting the human 
specificity of authors and actors. For him, focusing on the sound of a 
performed poem “returns voice from sometimes idealized projections of self 
in the style of a poem to its social materiality, to voicing and voices” 
(Bernstein 144).  The materiality of the audible voice richly encodes 
information about subject position: gender, class, nationality, region.  Race, 
too, may sometimes be communicated in speech—but only insofar as it is 
performed via accentual and syntactic patterns that conform to listeners’ 
expectations about the speech of particular identity groups.  The clearly-
enunciated, standard-accented speech of the professional actors on the Tis 
of Thee cd gives away as little as possible in the way of information about 
these particular speakers’ identities—and since the text is read by actors, we 
do not hear Fanny Howe’s voice at all.  To obscure the particularities of the 
identity, of course, is to exercise power:  the less idiosyncratic and human an 
author, the more authoritative. “Poetry’s all about the accent while theory 
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has a tendency to sound the impersonal,” Bernstein writes (143); similarly, in 
seeking status, the upwardly mobile often discipline their accents to an elite 
normative accent that the community has agreed to perceive as no accent at 
all. But to know a person is to know the idiosyncracies of which her voice is 
capable; in casual or intimate situations, we allow our standardized vocal 
masks to slip away and our specific histories to become audible. 
 In Tis of Thee, those specific histories mark bodies, forge community, 
and undermine the bourgeois, elitist power of racial whiteness.  Throughout 
the text, Fanny Howe makes it very clear that the challenge the United States 
faces is not—and has perhaps never been—the integration of bodies.  X and 
Y live near one another and have no trouble meeting, falling in love, or 
conceiving a child; Z is a mixed-race child among many, many mixed-race 
American children.  Bodies mingled under even under Jim Crow, and they 
certainly mingle now.  But what America has still not managed to integrate is 
status:  white versus not-white, elect versus fallen, free versus unfree.  
Altruism’s turn away from the self and its competitive desires, towards the 
other to whom one responds, tends to erode such distinctions.  And if 
whiteness is extreme individualism, then the committed altruist creates a self, 
a nation, a little less white. 
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STRANGE INVITATION:  NONSENSE AND UTOPIA IN 
HARRYETTE MULLEN’S SLEEPING WITH THE DICTIONARY 
If you thought that you were making your way 
To where the puzzles and pagans lay 
I’ll put it together: it’s a strange invitation 
—Beck, from Odelay 
  
 To subtitle this essay “Nonsense and Utopia” may be to structure its 
investigation around a central vacuum:  non-sense, no-place.  But the 
vacuum in Harryette Mullen’s Sleeping with the Dictionary is not a lack; this 
is robustly playful writing with strong moral and geographic centers—there 
is a there there.  The space in these poems is not so much an absence as a 
place that has been set with care and now awaits a guest.  Sleeping with the 
Dictionary actively and curiously welcomes its active, curious reader. 
 For Mullen, crafting hospitably spacious texts is an explicitly political 
project. She has announced that she is “interested in the shared aspirations 
of social and aesthetic movements that envision a better world” (Kane 134); 
more recently she explained, “Given my concern about literacy, I've often 
thought about the possibility of connecting writers, readers, and nonreaders 
through a practice that encompasses aspects of written and spoken language. 
To the extent that a text hails its readers, I've begun to consider how a poetic 
work might overcome the social barriers that reinforce what I've called 
‘aesthetic apartheid’”5 (Crumpacker).  Active verbs and spatial imagery 
(connecting, encompasses, hails, overcome . . . barriers) that often appear as 
                                                
5 “While I celebrate the differences that create distinct aesthetic preferences,” Mullen tells Kane, “I seek to 
overcome the social segregation that enforces aesthetic apartheid.  In Los Angeles, for example, this might 
require that I drive out of my own familiar neighborhood to see an art exhibit in Little Tokyo or attend a 
poetry reading at the Institute of Italian Culture—to recall a couple of excursions I’ve made recently—in 
between taking visitors to the Watts Towers and to the World Stage in Leimert Park” (134). 
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metaphorical in the context of literary discourse become more concrete and 
literal when Mullen uses them:  not only is “the reader . . . invited to 
participate in” Sleeping with the Dictionary’s elliptical poems very directly 
“through the ‘game’ of filling in the blanks” (Kane 16); her previous book, 
Muse & Drudge, was in part an experiment in changing the demographics of 
the bodies physically present in the audiences at Mullen’s readings.  As 
Mullen has expressed it on different occasions, “Muse & Drudge was crucial, 
because it seemed to unite readers of my first book, Tree Tall Woman, with 
the audience that was attracted to the formal innovation of Trimmings and 
S*PeRM**K*T” (Crumpacker) “and, judging from the audiences that I see 
now, it has done what I wanted it to do, because I’m now reading to an 
integrated room” (Griffin 18).  In the more usual metaphorical sense, Mullen 
describes “the instability of interpretation when people don't necessarily 
share the same cultural knowledge or social background” as a challenge that 
has led her to “leave space for divergent interpretations of unknown 
readers” (Crumpacker, emphasis mine).  Thus Mullen’s poetry sets out 
explicitly to desegregate (along lines of race, class, nationality, and education) 
both the imaginary community of private readers and the public 
performance space of the poetry reading. 
 
Context:  Utopian “Poetics/Politics” 
 Utopian literature has been defined as literature that “invites readers 
to experience vicariously an alternative reality that critiques theirs by opening 
cognitive and affective spaces that encourage readers to perceive the realities 
and potentialities of their culture in new ways” (Roemer 20).6  Inviting her 
readers not only to alternative “cognitive and affective spaces” but also to 
                                                
6 To be fair, Roemer himself acknowledges that this “working definition” is in some ways too narrow. 
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physical spaces where diversity and social justice are manifestly valued, 
Mullen’s work both fulfills and exceeds such criteria for utopian writing.  
“Recent attempts to define literary utopias imply an elevation of the reader,” 
this argument continues, “as scholars and critics shift their interests away 
from what utopian literature is to what it does” (3).  Again, Mullen’s interest 
in the (admittedly modest) material effects a book of poetry can produce and 
her regard for readers as participants in a mutual creative process mark her 
as a utopian poet.  Mullen aligns herself with Robert Creeley and Allen 
Ginsberg as she observes, “The poems these writers produce are intended, 
in part, to serve as alternative models for a progressive and flexible 
poetics/politics” (Kane 17). 
 That slash mark hinging poetics and politics cuts to the heart of 
Harryette Mullen’s work.  Citing Erica Hunt’s “Notes for an Oppositional 
Poetics,” Mullen notes that “aesthetic and political opposition to the status 
quo do not necessarily go hand in hand” (134), but in his introduction to the 
same volume Daniel Kane points out that progressive politics are a 
distinguishing feature of the contemporary American avant garde (15).  
Commitment to a politics that challenges capitalism, imperialism, racism, and 
sexism has been a major force in American poetry throughout the twentieth 
century and reaches back at least as far as the abolitionist poetry of the 
nineteenth.  It makes sense that we should be moved by works which both 
delight and boldly confront us:  philosophical, moral, or political 
intervention without delight strikes us as sermon or propaganda, while 
beauty or fun without such confrontation can offer at best only pretty, 
forgettable trifles—and at worst can flatter complacency, dullness, and 
unquestioned conformity. 
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In recent years, overtly political projects in American poetry have 
belonged, roughly, to one of two strains.  On the one hand, certain poetry 
practices take up radical politics very straightforwardly as a topic.  The 
spoken word poetry that falls into this category is related to rap and to the 
work of the Beat and Black Arts poets.  On the other hand, some poetry 
seeks to question the very concept of topic.  Such poetry locates its political 
project in a disruption and examination of poetic and linguistic form.  These 
poems are heavily indebted to language poetry.  For readers in search of 
poetry that provides both aesthetic and political excitement, each of these 
approaches presents some serious potential pitfalls.  A brief look at excerpts 
from two poems—Amiri Baraka’s “Understanding Readiness” and Ron 
Silliman’s Tjanting—will demonstrate what I mean.  I choose these poems as 
my “bad examples” not because I find them valueless or unappealing—in 
fact, I quite like them—but because neither of them dances as gracefully 
across the “progressive and flexible poetics/politics” slash mark as most of 
the poems in Sleeping with the Dictionary. 
 Turning first to three stanzas from Amiri Baraka’s elegy for Stokely 
Carmichael, “Understanding Readiness,” I want to highlight their apparent 
subscription to the hope and belief that poetry can be—in the words of 
poetry activist and slam promoter Bob Holman—“powerful, not as a literary 
conceit, but as an actual tool for building a new society, a tool for a new 
patriotism.”  Following Derek Attridge, I will term such “hope or . . . 
assumption that [poems] can be instrumental in furthering an existing 
project” poetic instrumentalism. 
How do we know who are our friends and 
who are our enemies 
 Only by what they do, who they hold on too [sic], 
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 who they fight for and support.  Who they help, 
 who they feed in the storm, whose side 
 they’re on. 
 
How do we know who can lead? 
 Only by seeing them do it, only by 
 Feeling the realness and hopefulness, 
 their sincerity, and 
 courage, only by touching their love 
 for the actual selves of us, only 
 
 By their suffering in our name, the jailings, 
 the beatings and torture, only by the way 
 our enemies describe them, 
 only by their wisdom and plans, 
 their affirmations, their pronouncements and 
 positions, what they think and move on. 
 
 What direction they give  
 us to transform our slave conditions. 
 
Can we name those who are our heroes? 
 Yes, if we are conscious, even when 
 they are still alive. 
 
 This poem’s identification with the jailed, the beaten, the tortured and 
the enslaved makes its progressive political agenda clear; its plural point of 
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view, its double impulse towards empiricism and idealism, and its dedication 
to Stokely Carmichael all strengthen that alignment.  The poem’s form 
resonates with the speeches of the Civil Rights Movement and the sermons 
of black American churches.  With its clear, accessible diction and syntax 
and its strongly anaphoric, catechistic structure, “Understanding Readiness” 
bends all its formal force towards making its meaning easy to follow and 
remember, even aurally, even for an audience hearing it only once.   But 
while the poem’s politics may be one of “transform[ing] our slave 
conditions,” its poetics is less—to use Mullen’s terms—“progressive and 
flexible.”   
To elucidate why and how not, it may be helpful to turn to Ron 
Silliman’s 1977 essay “Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the 
World.”  In that essay, Silliman distinguishes between reference and 
referentiality. He writes: 
In its primary form, reference takes the character of a gesture 
and an object, such as the picking up of a stone to be used as a 
tool.  Both gesture and object carry their own integrities and 
are not confused:  a sequence of gestures is distinct from the 
objects which may be involved . . . .  A sequence of gestures 
forms a discourse, not a description.  It is precisely the 
expressive integrity of the gestural nature of language which 
constitutes the meaning of the “nonsense” syllables in tribal 
poetries. 
125 
 
Silliman identifies such poetic elements as rhyme as traces of this primary 
“gestural nature of language.”  Another way of understanding Silliman’s 
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argument is in terms of the signifier versus the signified.  In very 
instrumental language—say, the instructions in a manual, or my words to 
you if I saw you were about to spill your wine on my lap—signifieds are, of 
course, primary.  It matters little how you aesthetically experience the 
gestures or sounds I make or the way the little marks I write on the page 
look.  Instead, in such a case, I want you to experience my language as 
transparent—I want you to skip musing on the signifiers in order to access 
the ideas that are signified:  “Don’t spill your wine on me!” 
Poetry, though, is a venue where we are interested in gesture and its 
aesthetic effects.  Poetry organizes itself around the physical properties of 
signifiers—their rhyming or assonant or rhythmic sounds, their lineated 
shapes, the oddly appropriate or ironic relationships between signifier and 
signified we see in puns.  Such wordplay collects and organizes signifiers, 
implying a necessity in the mark or sound that ordinary, everyday language 
treats as arbitrary.  “Understanding Readiness” strikes me as (in a twenty-
first century context) fairly formally conservative because it seems so 
uninterested in exploring the pleasures of signifiers.  Even when it plays on 
them, as in the repetitions of words and syntactic structures, that play is all in 
the service of helping us apprehend the signifieds to which it directs our 
attention.  A perusal of Baraka’s own 1963 critical book Blues People reveals 
that the relatively unadorned didacticism of “Understanding Readiness” runs 
counter not just to twenty-first-century avant-garde aesthetic preferences but 
to the African cultural values Baraka prizes.  He quotes anthropologist 
Ernest Borneman:  “In language, the African tradition aims at 
circumlocution rather than at exact definition.  The direct statement is 
considered crude and unimaginative; the veiling of all contents in ever-
changing paraphrases is considered the criterion of intelligence and 
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personality.”  By such a criterion, Baraka ought to prefer a style more like 
Silliman’s from the opening of Tjanting: 
Not this. 
What then? 
I started over & over.  Not this. 
Last week I wrote “the muscles in my palm so sore from 
halving the rump roast I cld barely grip the pen.”  What then?  
This morning my lip is blisterd. 
Of about to within which.  Again & again I began.  The 
gray light of day fills the yellow room in a way wch is somber.  
Not this.  Hot grease had spilld on the stove top. 
Nor that either.  Last week I wrote “the muscle at 
thumb’s root so taut from carving that beef I thought it wld 
cramp.”  Not so.  What then?  Wld I begin?  This morning my 
lip is tender, disfigurd.  I sat in an old chair out behind the 
anise.  I cld have gone about this in some other way. 
 
Silliman allows us to savor words which, strung together outside 
syntax (“of about to within which”), lose their referents and become mere 
sounds; he points up the contingency of the signifier-signified relationship 
by having his speaker tell us about his hurt thumb and lip twice, in different 
words each time.  His frequently contracted orthography plays on the 
relationship between printed and spoken signifiers, orchestrating a 
colloquial, oral “feel” for the page.  Enjoyable as this play with signifiers may 
be, though, it strikes me ultimately as politically quietistic.  The reader is 
invited to join the poet in playing around with language—to imagine and 
reimagine expression as contingent.  But in this instance, the contingent 
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language we’re invited to play with is the musing of a beef-fed writer 
struggling, in a fairly uncritically solipsistic way, with writer’s cramp in the 
pleasant writing space of his backyard, behind the anise.  It’s difficult to 
imagine how such play, however intellectually stimulating, could have 
particularly high social stakes. 
One might be tempted at this point to ascribe the political 
progressivism, on the one hand, of Baraka’s poem and the aesthetic 
progressivism, on the other, of Silliman’s, to their respective subject 
positions—distinguished from one another by race.  Silliman has, in fact, 
engaged in just this sort of ascription:   
Progressive poets who identify as members of groups that have 
been the subject of history—many white male heterosexuals, 
for example—are apt to challenge all that is supposedly 
“natural” about the formation of their own subjectivity.  That 
their writing today is apt to call into question, if not actually 
explode, such conventions as narrative, persona and even 
reference can hardly be surprising.  At the other end of this 
spectrum are poets who do not identify as members of groups 
that have been the subject of history, for they have been its 
objects.  The narrative of history has led not to their self-
actualization, but to their exclusion and domination.  These 
writers and readers—women, people of color, sexual 
minorities, the entire spectrum of the “marginal”—have a 
manifest political need to have their stories told. That their 
writing should often appear much more conventional, with the 
notable difference as to whom is the subject of those 
conventions, illuminates the relationship between form and 
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audience.                                    “Poetry and the Politics of the 
Subject” 63      
 
In the introduction to his book Discrepant Engagement, Nathaniel Mackey 
counters, “There are, however, writers from socially marginalized groups 
who do both—tell their stories while calling such conventions into question, 
tell their stories by calling such conventions into question.  The distinction 
between a formally experimental center and a formally conventional 
periphery distorts and grossly oversimplifies matters”—as so many poets’ 
work illustrates, Harryette Mullen’s especially (19).  Although Mullen 
sympathetically cites an account similar to Silliman’s—“You know, there was 
a joke that circulated among minority (and some women) graduate students:  
‘It’s that white male subjectivity that needs to be put on hold . . . the rest of 
us . . . need our subjectivity’”—she also questions it:   
Ron Silliman, in “The New Sentence,” talks about . . . I think 
the essay’s called “The Political Economy of Poetry,” and he 
ends it by talking about this perceived division between what 
are called the “Aesthetic Schools of writing” and the “codes of 
oppressed peoples.” He says, of course, the aesthetic schools 
are not without their politics or their ideological stance, they 
just express it through aesthetic means and procedures.  And I 
would want to add that—I don’t think he does but I would 
want to add—the codes of oppressed peoples also have their 
aesthetic basis. 
Griffin 11 
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Mullen joins Mackey’s category of “writers . . . who do both” by asking 
herself, “Well, in what ways would I want to problematize my black female 
subjectivity,” acknowledging and rethinking the assumptions that underlie 
“the tradition of the ‘authentic voice,’” in which she places her first book, 
Tree Tall Woman (Griffin 2). 
 Before looking closely at Mullen’s work, this essay will take one more 
brief detour.  Although Sleeping with the Dictionary is a twenty-first century 
American—and in fact quite specifically Los Angelean—book of poems, its 
obsession with the playful rearrangement of linguistic elements according to 
gamelike sets of rules places it squarely in the tradition of the Oulipo.  
Formed in France in the 1960s, the Oulipo dedicated itself to producing sets 
of constraints for the purpose of triggering and inspiring works of literature.  
Famous examples include the snowball, in which each successive word is 
one letter longer than the previous one; the N+7, in which each noun in a 
pre-existing text is replaced by the seventh noun after it in a designated 
dictionary—for example, depending upon the dictionary you choose, “Our 
Father, who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name” might become “Our 
fauna, who art in hedgerow, hallowed be thy napkin;” and the lipogram, in 
which a chosen letter or letters are systematically excluded from the text—
for example, George Perec’s La Disparition, translated into English as A 
Void, a novel that contains not a single letter e.   
 The Oulipian business of inventing sets of constraints immediately 
invites readers to reverse-engineer constrained texts and to try their own 
hands at constrained writing—indeed, histories of this group generally read 
like books of creative-writing assignments.  And because Oulipian sets of 
rules generally concern issues of sound and orthography, Oulipian 
constraints focus readers’ attention very particularly on signifiers as opposed 
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to the concepts they signify.  If everyday conversational language tends to 
focus on signifieds—and if literary language (and poetry especially) produces 
aesthetic pleasure by playing with signifiers, or by playing with relationships 
between signifiers and signifieds—then Oulipian writing takes the literary 
preoccupation with signifiers to an extreme that stands conventional 
linguistic priorities on their heads.  Take for example this excerpt—a 
lipogram in which all vowels other than o have been excluded—from  
Eunoia, by contemporary Canadian poet Christian Bök:  
Monks who vow to do God’s work go forth from 
donjons of monkhood to show flocks lost to God how 
God’s word brooks no crooks who plot to do wrong.  
Folks who go to Sodom kowtow to Moloch, so God 
drops H-bombs of horror onto poor townsfolk, most of 
whom mock Mormon proofs of godhood.  Folks who 
do not follow God’s norms word for word woo God’s 
scorn, for God frowns on fools who do not conform to 
orthodox protocol.  Whoso honors no cross of dolors 
nor crown of thorns doth go on, forsooth, to sow 
worlds of sorrow.  Lo!  No Song of Solomon comforts 
Job or Lot, both of whom know for whom gongs of 
doom doth toll.  Oh, mondo doloroso.                                                                      
60 
 
In reading more traditional poetry, the reader tends to focus first on the 
content being expressed, and then to experience sonic felicities as a kind of 
bonus.  But in Eunoia and similar texts, the constraints on signifiers are so 
extreme and obvious that they come to the forefront of the reading 
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experience.  That such constrained language manages also make fairly 
coherent sense starts to seem like the product of incredible virtuosity.  Here, 
the play and pleasure of signifiers is primary, and what is signified becomes 
the bonus. 
 
Stitched Fragments, Disruptive Readings 
 Similarly, Mullen’s Sleeping with the Dictionary structures itself first 
and foremost around the sensual pleasures of language, around the beauty 
and humor a play of signifiers can produce.  As in Bök’s Eunoia, sometimes 
the games and constraints to which Mullen subjects signifiers make it seem 
miraculous that any sense is produced at all.  And in this context, the greater 
marvel still is that this delightfully playful, inviting book manages to maintain 
an insistent, historically and geographically specific political engagement.  (As 
we will see, it is only when the book’s political engagement relaxes—or, less 
often, when it usurps linguistic play’s primacy—that Sleeping with the 
Dictionary fails to delight.) 
“Between” (9) is one of the book’s most strictly and identifiably 
patterned game-poems.  As printed in Sleeping with the Dictionary, its 
eleven lines read: 
My ass acts bad 
Devil your ears Charybdis 
Good engagements deep blue sea 
Heaven my eyes your elbow 
Last night jobs hard place 
Now his legs hell 
Rock the lines me 
Scylla her breasts shinola 
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Shit the sheets then 
Yesterday my thighs this morning 
You your toes today 
 
The poem can be imagined as divided into three vertical columns (A, B, C).   
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
My ass 
Devil 
Good 
Heaven 
Last night 
Now 
Rock 
Scylla 
Shit 
Yesterday 
You 
 
acts 
your ears 
engagements 
my eyes 
jobs 
his legs 
the lines 
her breasts 
the sheets 
my thighs 
your toes 
 
 
bad 
Charybdis 
deep blue sea 
your elbow 
hard place 
hell 
me 
shinola 
then 
this morning 
today 
 
In column B Mullen has arranged eleven plural nouns that commonly occur 
as the objects of the preposition between.  Of these, seven are intimately 
bodily:  the cerebral ears, the threatened eyes, the legs, breasts, thighs, toes, 
and the metonymically sexual sheets.  Of the four remaining, two imply 
unemployment—engagements and jobs—while the other two refer to 
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dramatic loci of, respectively, suspended and surfeit meaning—acts and 
lines.   
Eleven common phrases and idioms beginning with between have 
been split into columns A and C:  Scylla, for example, appears in A and 
Charybdis in C; devil in A and deep blue sea in C; shit in A and shinola in C.  
But since the items within each column have been arranged alphabetically 
(except her breasts, which have sagged far below their place), Scylla has 
become detached from Charybdis to recombine into a new phrase:  “Scylla 
her breasts shinola” (line 8).  The effect is a cubist jumble of body parts and 
economic anxiety couched in tough talk.  Each line becomes a three-
windowed slot machine (or maybe the children’s mismatching toy Ole 
Million Face).  Sometimes the recombined phrases work as new sentences 
(“My ass acts bad,” line 1; “Shit the sheets then,” line 9), but more frequently 
the fit is less comfortable—lines like “Good engagements deep blue sea” (3) 
and “Now his legs hell” (6) offer potential sense, but elliptically—the reader 
must supply connective tissue to fill the interstices, or in other words, the 
reader is now responsible for what comes between.  The inherent 
equivocality of between-ness becomes evident:  pushing themselves between 
columns A and C, the contents of column B both separate the elements of 
established idiom and glue together the fragments once that idiom is 
fractured.  In the context of economic and bodily vulnerability, such 
equivocal between-ness carries high stakes.   
In contrast with Baraka’s “Understanding Readiness,” “Between” 
never spells out what those stakes are.  Nor does it spell out even the 
constraints that have structured its construction; Mullen has left the three-
column structure for alert readers to discover, offering the poem’s 
prepositional key—between—in its title as a person lending her house to 
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friends for the weekend might leave a key under the mat, inviting readers to 
the pleasure of discovering its organizational principle via their familiarity 
with the discourses from which the poem’s idioms are drawn.7  Kenneth 
Roemer might describe the relatively straightforward “Understanding 
Readiness” as a utopian text “emphasi[zing] . . . the normative-prescriptive 
functions”—a text which “privileges the author and text as creator and 
transmitter of representations of” (or exhortations to create) “better worlds 
that ‘correct’ the evils of the present” in what “could be termed the 
conversion experience model of utopian reading” (63).  Structured to invite 
readers to an open-ended process of meditation on the physical and 
economic pleasures and risks of liminality, “Between” emphasizes what 
Roemer identifies as utopian writing’s other function:  the iconoclastic.  
“Utopias disrupt assumptions about the reader’s present.  The disruptions 
cause confusion, but they can also create room . . . for the development of 
critical perspectives about the present hitherto unexamined by the reader . . . 
The text invite[s] the reader’s confusion.”  In “Between,” readers arrive at a 
productive confusion about the political stakes of being “between” via an 
initial, inviting confusion about poetic syntax and structure.  At the same 
time that the poem performs this utopian function, it is not necessarily a 
political poem per se—its withholding of the context and stakes of the 
between-ness it probes makes it feel more like a pre- or potentially political 
poem, a poem whose game-structure moves readers into the playfully alert 
and critical mental state that Sleeping with the Dictionary—like active 
citizenship itself—requires.   
                                                
7 I use discourses—plural—to point up the very different milieux in which a speaker would likely utter the 
phrases “between shit and shinola,” for example, and “between Scylla and Charybdis.”  Such a blending of 
discourses is another of Daniel Kane’s criteria for inclusion in the contemporary poetic avant garde, and it’s 
a technique Mullen frequently uses to inclusive, democratizing effect. 
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The unrhymed and unmetered prose blocks “Dim Lady” (20) and 
“Variation on a Theme Park” (75) also present a reconsideration of the 
poem qua poem as their invitation to disruptive reading.  Rewriting or 
translating Shakespeare’s Sonnet 130—“My Mistress’ Eyes Are Nothing Like 
the Sun”—complete clause by complete clause (Mullen uses a period 
everywhere Shakespeare uses a period or a semicolon), these poems play on 
the ultimate canonical English-language poet—Shakespeare—as he writes in 
the ultimate canonical English-language poetic form—the sonnet.  The 
poems are reverent in their very irreverence, marking the English canon as a 
set of objects to be enjoyed deconstructively and interactively rather than 
treated as fragile relics.  Mullen’s collaging of readymade contemporary 
vernacular phrases and idioms onto Shakespearian templates highlights the 
readerliness of her poetic practice, encouraging reader to identify with writer 
and to try his own hand at the games she plays with language.  These two 
poems arise from exercises she offers to her creative writing students, a fact 
which illustrates Mullen’s belief in their infectious generativity (Kane 135). 
“Dim Lady” retains Sonnet 130’s basic sense, but trades Shakespeare’s 
idiom for an exaggeratedly slangy 2002 vernacular; “Variation on a Theme 
Park” modifies the Oulipian game of S+7 to retain the original poem’s 
syntax and the initial letters of all the poem’s substantive words (personal 
pronouns and forms of the verb “be” change their initial letters as the 
mistress becomes Walt and verb usage is updated), but transform 
Shakespeare’s love poem into the lament of one lost in a nightmarishly 
commodified and Disneyfied late-capitalist American landscape.  In fact, 
both revisions of the sonnet evoke an overwhelmingly commercial 
contemporary landscape; “Dim Lady”’s diction is not only casual and 
irreverent (very much in keeping with the spirit of Shakespeare’s original 
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poem), it is also infected at every turn with brand names (Red Lobster, 
Slinkys, Shakey’s Pizza Parlors, Muzak, Twinkie) and references to 
advertising (neon, minty-fresh mouthwashes) and commodified human 
beauties (Marilyn Monroes, any lanky model or platinum movie idol).  Such 
infection reveals the extent of the commercialization of the  century 
American milieu:  to speak in our idiom is to spew product placements, even 
(especially?) in the intimate space of the love poem. 
 “Dim Lady”’s translation also points up the insistent whiteness of 
beauty standards, both in Shakespeare’s time and—even more—our own.  
The Shakespearian mistress fails to live up to the Elizabethan ideal of snow-
white skin, coral-red lips, rose-red cheeks, and silky black hair; Mullen’s dim 
lady similarly fails in the quest for the perfect red-and-white complexion.  
But whereas Shakespeare’s mistress’ hair is black and wiry—a type of hair 
that in the U.S. might tend to racialize the mistress as other than strictly 
white—Mullen’s lady is blonde.  And yet, even this whitening fails to 
approach the new standard of white perfection:  the dim lady’s blonde is 
“dishwater,” whereas she aspires to the “platinum” of a “movie idol” like 
Marilyn Monroe.  Given that platinum blonde is so unnatural a hair color 
that its popularity as a beauty standard is linked with the tacitly 
acknowledged expense of maintaining it (everyone knows Norma Jeane was 
really a brunette), even the whitening-up of the updated beauty standard 
smacks of commodity fetish. 
 “Variation on a Theme Park,” in contrast to Shakespeare’s sonnet, is 
not a love poem at all but a cry of “loneliness as reckless as any bought with 
free coupons.”  The personal, flesh-and-blood mistress has become that 
two-dimensional mass-mediated image, Mickey Mouse; “heaven” has 
become “halogen-light,” “perfumes,” “breath” and “cheek” are now 
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“purchases,” “bargains” and “checkbook” and the result of this consumer 
isolation is that “roses damasked, red” become “roadkill damaged, riddled;” 
“delight” becomes “deliberation;” “snow” becomes “sorrow” and “love,” 
“loneliness.”  Indeed, where Shakespeare’s original poem proclaims that the 
mistress’s imperfections do not dampen the lover’s desire, Mullen’s 
revisitation both advances and hamstrings the argument that alienation is no 
less tragic or desperate for occurring in a banal commercial fantasyland:  
exactly how “reckless” is “any souvenir bought with free coupons”?8  
Shakespeare and Mullen both claim transcendent emotion for the 
unromantic and quotidian world, but whereas Shakespeare’s relatively 
sincere speaker seeks to reconcile flawed reality with ideal perfection, Mullen 
takes on the even more complex and harrowing search for authenticity and 
significance in an economy where everything is available for discount—and 
she does so in a voice whose surreal bathos threatens to overwhelm the 
argument with comically juxtaposed details. 
 Turning to another highly contested and racially segregated segment 
of the late-capitalist economy of Southern California, Mullen offers us 
“Bilingual Instructions” (10)—despite its bilinguality one of the most 
transparent, and transparently political, poems in the book.  Beginning with a 
reference to the 1998 referendum in which Californian voters passed the 
Unz initiative requiring all public school instruction to be conducted in 
English, the poem reveals Californian priorities by noting where Spanish 
instructions are not to be found (“on ballots”) and where they are (“on 
curbside waste receptacles”).  The message is clear:  California (whoever that 
                                                
8 The ambivalent recklessness of a souvenir “bought” for free indicates the pinnacle (or 
nadir) of the plastic Disney fantasy:  the souvenir’s free status means there are no limits, 
but there are also no stakes. 
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comprises) insists that voters speak English, but graciously extends its 
regulations regarding proper waste disposal to English and Spanish speakers 
alike.  The Spanish speaker’s place is not in the voting booth, but at the 
curbside, keeping his own neighborhood orderly as well as the wealthy white 
neighborhood where he might work:  the final couplet, “Recortes de jardin 
solamente / Yard clippings only” brings to mind the figure of the hired 
Mexican gardener, a person himself reduced to yard clippings by an “only” 
sign—reminiscent, in the apartheid climate Mullen reveals, of the “white” 
and “colored” signs of Jim Crow.  By arranging the poem into six couplets 
the last three of which are translating pairs, Mullen mimics the non-English 
speaker’s experience of meaning withheld from him:  the lines in the 
“English” position of the first two couplets read “to bilingual instruction in 
schools” and “to bilingual instructions on ballots,” but so far from including 
Spanish speakers in debate on these issues, the positionally “Spanish” line of 
each couplet offers only “Californians say No” in place of translations.  
Even when in the third couplet “Californians” finally “say Yes,” what 
they’ve said yes to is the longest and potentially least comprehensible English 
line; the bilingual demonstration that follows is a crushing mockery of real 
inclusion. 
Similarly, “We Are Not Responsible” (77) adopts the language of 
standard airline disclaimers to articulate the United States’ hand-washing 
social Darwinist stance towards foreigners, immigrants, and people of color 
within its borders.  Maintaining an ironic tone that balances on a knife’s edge 
between comic and terrifying, Mullen begins with a reference to this 
country’s failure, in the century and a half since emancipation, to offer 
reparations or even an official apology to the families of former slaves— 
“We are not responsible for your lost or stolen relatives”—and builds, 
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disclaimer by disclaimer, to a climax—“Please remain calm, or we can’t be 
held responsible for what happens to you”—which is homicidally 
threatening under any circumstances, but becomes psychotic in a context 
which implies that it is spoken in the calm and cheerful disembodied voice 
of official corporatespeak.  Mullen’s adoption of the “we” point of view 
satirizes the language of corporate disclaimer, but the first-person plural also 
subtly implicates both reader and implied author in the disavowed cultural 
violence the poem describes:  Mullen skewers corporate American 
complicity and complacency, but implicitly acknowledges her own—and her 
implied reader’s—membership in the American economy. 
 Placed side by side with Baraka’s “Understanding Readiness,” 
Mullen’s “Bilingual Instructions” and “We Are Not Responsible” still feel 
quite geared towards the iconoclastic or disruptive end of Roemer’s scale of 
utopian literary function.  In the former poem, the first three couplets simply 
report recent California legislation and the last three simply transcribe the 
instructions on curbside waste receptacles; all moral comment, all didactic 
prescription, is communicated by the juxtaposition of those first three 
couplets with the second three, by the poem’s translating-couplet structure, 
by resonances between its language and historical languages of exclusion, 
and by its context in this book of diversity-celebrating poems.  The poem’s 
didactic message is not on the surface, but only available for the reader who 
is willing to engage the poem analytically.  Once tracked down, though, that 
message is unambiguous.  “We Are Not Responsible,” though taking its cue 
from standard disclaimers such as “We reserve the right to refuse service to 
anyone,” makes the bitter irony of its we voice unmistakable:  “You were 
detained for interrogation because you fit the profile” and “It’s not our fault 
you were born wearing a gang color” are certainly messages that 
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contemporary U. S. authority figures often strongly imply, but to speak them 
explicitly as this poem does is shocking, damning.  As iconoclastically reader-
centered as Mullen’s poems may seem next to Baraka’s, in the context of 
Sleeping with the Dictionary these two are quite prescriptive; in particular, 
“Bilingual Instructions” lacks the humor—even the dark humor of “We Are 
Not Responsible”—at the heart of most of the book’s poems; the grim 
purposefulness of “Bilingual Instructions” robs it of a great deal of its poetic 
excitement and thus its utopian power to disrupt.  Somewhat more 
mysterious, difficult, and thus subversive is another of the book’s poems 
about white California’s exploitation and exclusion of immigrant workers. 
Couched in ornate nineteenth-century legalese into which the surreal 
phrase “bitter labor” insistently, repeatedly intrudes, “Xenophobic 
Nightmare in a Foreign Language” (81) feels, at first reading, opaque and 
mysterious:  “Whereas, in the opinion of the Government of the United 
States the coming of bitter labor to this country endangers the good order of 
certain localities within the territory thereof . . . ”  “Bitter labor,” it turns out, 
is the literal English translation of the Chinese term from which the word 
coolie is derived.  The poem paraphrases four sections of the United States’ 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, replacing the phrases Chinese laborer and 
Chinese person wherever they occur with the phrase bitter labor.  Thus 
Mullen renders the language of the Act’s xenophobic nightmare foreign—
inviting the reader to reflect upon the foreignness, in turn, of the Act’s 
original English to the people it was designed to exclude.  On the one hand, 
the poem’s adjusted text now bans not Chinese people, but the grueling 
work to which they were subjected, from the United States; on the other, its 
substitution of the labor for the laborer points up the utilitarian 
objectification Chinese Americans may have experienced in their new 
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homeland—a place in which they were regarded not as immigrants, citizens, 
or people, but as laborers.9 
The metonymic shift from laborer to labor is a loaded one, mirroring 
as it does the physical synecdoche experienced by alienated workers divorced 
by late capitalist overspecialization from the satisfaction of crafting a whole 
object.  In New Deal Modernism, Michael Szalay suggests that early 
twentieth-century avant gardists—the Dadaists, for example, to whom 
Mullen and other  century experimental writers owe so much—were 
attracted to performance and to arbitrarily constrained creative practices 
precisely in order to attempt mastery over the relationship of parts to wholes 
(111-2).  Szalay explains,  
Fashioning fully organic texts . . . is a means of producing 
forms invulnerable to the wounds that beset the body and 
personal identity . . .a literary text . . . is the aggregation of a 
specified set of words and the stipulation that this set of words 
is a unique identity . . . the loss of any one of its words makes it 
not a lesser version of the original but something categorically 
different from it.  Inviolate, this text is not subject to pain, 
                                                
9 Somewhat more puzzling is the poem’s dedication or subtitle, “waking up with Enrique Chagoya.”  
Chagoya, the artist whose Line Essence Color adorns the cover of Sleeping with the Dictionary, is a 
Chicano artist whose highly political, often comic or satirical collaged and mixed-media artworks—like 
Mullen’s poems—draw their inspiration from a wide range of sources ranging from pre-Colombian art to 
U.S. popular culture.  Drawing a parallel between Chagoya’s work and Mullen’s makes sense, as both their 
artistic methods and their political stances are similar.  But why this poem in specific?  In 2004 Chagoya 
took part in the traveling exhibition “Misleading Trails,” designed to promote exchange between Chinese 
and American artists, but Sleeping with the Dictionary was published in 2002.  Of course, since both 
Mullen and Chagoya live in Los Angeles, it’s possible that Mullen knew the exhibition was being organized.  
At any rate, Chagoya’s complex take on economic and racial relations provide a refreshing wake-up call 
from the xenophobia that produced the Chinese Exclusion Act.  The pairing “sleeping with the dictionary” 
and “waking up with Enrique Chagoya” positions Chagoya—and perhaps, by metonymic extension, 
creative practice in general or the visual arts in specific—as a livelier alternative to the static, arbitrarily 
arranged, and institutionally approved printed reference tome.  Of course, the erotic tone of the dedication 
is also undeniable. 
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because once altered “it” is a different form unrelated to the 
original. 
                                    100 
 
Such singular, inviolate texts—a hypermasculine literary response, 
Szalay shows, to the horrific mayhem of the first World War—are at the 
same time immensely fragile:  they cannot brook any alteration.  Following 
her Dadaist predecessors, Mullen instead crafts flexible texts:  not only ones 
vulnerable to—yet able to survive—wounding, but even texts that are in a 
sense pre-wounded.  I am referring, of course, to the collage-like texture of 
many of Mullen’s poems.  “The brash act of taking other people’s property 
and calling it your own,” Kane writes—referring to property like 
Shakespeare’s or the 1882 U. S. Congress’s—is “both subversive and 
democratic.  Collage prompts us to think about the very nature of language 
and identity” (12) as we encounter familiar phrases in strange contexts, 
textual bodies broken apart and rearranged into new, surprising, and vital 
wholes haunted, for readers who recognize them, by their original 
configurations. 
Mullen’s metonymic and synecdochal play invites readers into tricky 
linguistic territory.  At basic levels of meaning-making, metonymy “does not 
call for the magical”—that is, flashily “poetic”—“sharing of meaning that a 
metaphor implies; instead, it relies on connections that build up over time 
and the associations of usage;” in other words, in contradistinction to the 
insistently literary device of metaphor, “metonymy places us in the historical 
world of events and situations” (McLaughlin 85).  Dealing as they do in 
common-sense associations, metonymy and synecdoche risk contributing to 
languages of alienated labor and of essentialist stereotype—as Kate Pearcy 
 116 
points out, “the demand that minority texts be ‘sufficiently representative’ in 
order to claim critical attention . . . identifies the persistent logic of part for 
whole” (28).  But with her disruptive cut-and-paste poetic methods Mullen 
tends instead to point up and upset typical, stereotypical, thoughtless 
metonymies and synecdoches.  Mullen’s observation, “I can be a black 
woman while chewing gum and thinking about Disneyland or supermarkets, 
while reading Stein or Shakespeare, just as I can be a black woman 
contemplating conventional representations of black women in literature, 
media, and popular culture” (Kane 30) indicates her sensitivity to the myriad 
unexamined and unacknowledged parts of creative production and of human 
experience, whose complexity—when acknowledged—always far exceeds 
expectation, stereotype, and category.  And if the wholes Mullen creates still 
feel holey, fragmented—well, that too contributes to their utopian function:  
Mullen’s poetry, like John Ashbery’s as Kane describes it, “attempts to evoke 
the urge towards wholeness even as it recognizes that it cannot possibly 
capture everything.  But to fail . . . [presents the reader with] an even greater 
responsibility to continue chasing after the thought, even if it has no final, 
conclusive end” (21).  The open-endedness of Mullen’s synecdochal form 
exerts a moral and epistemological obligation upon the reader. 
At the same time, that fragmentary, non sequitur-filled, telegraphically 
synecdochal diction recalls the discourse with which we are barraged as we 
spend more and more time online.  “Swift Tommy” (70), a poem comprising 
a series of eight quasi-nonsensical Tom Swifties10, is a groan-inducing 
exercise in punster brainstorm, and yet from its ridiculous opening “nostalgia 
for parentheses” to its final image of virtual masturbation, it builds a sense 
                                                
10 A Tom Swifty is a type of pun involving direct reported speech:  “I’ve been eating lemons,” said Tom 
sourly. 
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of increasing technological anxiety and loss.  Such a punning form manages 
to pack gestures towards a huge number of complicated issues in remarkably 
few words, while the form’s reference to Victor Appleton’s wholesomely 
futuristic tales of a boy inventor contributes a whiff of retrofuturism to the 
poem’s cybermelancomic stance.  
In “Swift Tommy”’s first sentence, Sister Ka’s (an anagram for 
asterisk’s) nostalgia for punctuation seems not bizarre but commonplace in 
the context of burgeoning textspeak; a punctuational vocabulary that 
includes dashes, asterisks, parentheses, and dingbats as well as periods 
indicates an educational sophistication once associated with at least upper-
middle-class socioeconomic standing, now being technologically banished 
from the writing of all but professional writers and academics.  In the third 
sentence, it is the critic’s “moving finger” which speaks; alluding to The 
Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam’s pronouncement— 
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, 
 Moves on; nor all your Piety nor Wit 
 Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, 
 Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it. 
 
—the moving finger is a figure for the indelibility of the written word.  But 
this moving finger is “scrawling” about photographs “on the electronic 
notepad;” the ephemerality of the photograph (etymologically, light-writing) 
and especially of the electronic communication undermine any such 
permanency, and the oxymoronic or nonsensical “found topiaries” call into 
question the authority—even the identifiability—of artists and authors in the 
age of mechanical reproduction and Duchampian appropriation.   
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The next question—“Was it plastic or a fetish?”—unpacks itself from 
a question of relative rigidity (or of the technological origin of materials) to a 
question of kink to a question of commodity compulsion or mental health 
care for sale on credit.  Double entendres echo back and forth between “the 
imagineers of indebtedness” and “the psychosurgical micromanagers of 
desire.”  That plastic and fetish are posited as mutually exclusive possibilities 
would seem to evacuate any possibility of intense emotional investment in 
the synthetic material;11 opposed in this way, they might also come to stand 
in for the division between an over-technologized West and a more 
“primitive,” racialized, fetish-producing culture.  In fact, in the next 
enunciation, we see a synthetic material—“mock cashmere”—devouring and 
incorporating the speaker’s “ethnic pride”—a case in which technological 
commodity culture is not opposed to the racialized Other at all, but eager to 
appropriate his culture and leave him spewing paraphrased commercial 
slogans:  “I can’t believe it’s not bitter.” 
The next two Swifties view the body and the body politic as 
overlapping sites of nostalgic regret.  In the first—“‘Think of your appendix 
as an archaeological site, or a library of preventable diseases,’ the 
bespectacled white-coated professional added gratuitously to the critical 
list”—a vestigial body part (the appendix) becomes a cultural and public-
health vestige.  This apotheosis “burst”s the already-“ruined institutional 
pyramid scheme”—presenting medicine (“the bespectacled white-coated 
professional” who advises on appendices must be a doctor) as an artifact not 
only twice removed to the past, but as fraudulent in the first place; if the 
                                                
11 The Barthesian mythology of plastic both evacuates it of the power to become a commodity fetish—
“until now imitation materials have always indicated pretension . . . they aimed at reproducing cheaply the 
rarest substances, diamonds, silk, feathers . . .  Plastic has climbed down, it is a household material”—and 
elevates it to the ultimate commodity fetish—because “the whole world can be plasticized,” “objects will be 
invented for the sole pleasure of using them.” 
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body is gratuitous and the medical profession corrupt, the body’s continued 
health—either on its own merits or as maintained by social mechanisms—
becomes a slippery hope.  Meanwhile “the recidivist backslider falling off the 
anniversary wagon of second-hand chainsmoking reactionaries” vows 
“Never again!”—verbally striding into a hopeful future while inhaling and 
embodying a multiply compulsive, both private (anniversary, smoking) and 
public (recidivism, reactionism) repetition of the past. 
Finally, technology appears to close down the human realm entirely, 
leaving “the virtual master of cyberpornotopia” presumably online and thus 
in the most public of all possible spheres, yet disembodied and alone; despite 
his nominal mastery and the agency he assumes in making an obscene 
suggestion, that suggestion reveals that he is in fact powerless:  “If I had you 
where you’ve got me, I’d give myself a blowjob.”  But he doesn’t; it’s his 
own “pixilated hologram” who has him at its mercy in a censored scene of 
imaginary masturbatory sub- or abjection.  This representation of 
discorporated self-disempowerment is the logical conclusion to a poem this 
dystopian in its fractured and frustrated content—even while it offers 
readers pleasure and a reminder of their own relative, and embodied, power. 
 
Conclusion:  Artistic Excess as Utopian Someplace 
This examination of Sleeping with the Dictionary ends at the book’s 
beginning, with another poem whose diction of frustration and inability, in 
ironic tension with its own playful generativity, points up Mullen’s and the 
reader’s combined creative power.  “All She Wrote” (3) opens the book 
paradoxically with a phrase generally used as an ending; taking the traditional 
opening apologia to its logical extreme, this prose block piles up excuse after 
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excuse for not writing until one hardly expects any book to follow at all.12  
Yet the poem’s denials list precisely the methods Mullen will employ to write 
the book:  She writes, “I can’t write back.  I never read your letter.  I can’t 
say I got your note . . . Your hand’s illegible.  Your postcards were defaced,” 
but the book is everywhere a writing back—addressing, contesting, and 
revising the utterances that constitute our environment, and thus modeling 
the active, argumentative stance of her utopian reader.  She writes, “my 
computer was stolen.  Now I’m unable to process words.  I suffer from 
aphasia,” but the book is very specifically a kind of aphasic processing of 
words, a series of experimental computations in which language becomes 
defamiliarized, disoriented from its ordinary meaning.  “Didn’t you get a 
card from me yet?  What can I tell you?” the speaker asks, but the book is 
her card and contains what she can tell us.  “I admit I haven’t been recycling 
. . . I didn’t get to the market.  I meant to clip the coupons”—but through 
each poem drift recycled language (language destined for a Recyclopedia?), 
salvaged parts, commodities of all kinds—the book is in fact an exercise in 
the recycling of late-capitalist American cultural flotsam and jetsam.  In the 
poem’s final sentence, “Oprah came on with a fabulous author plugging her 
best-selling book”—a glut of advertising of which an experimental poet, 
even one as established as Mullen, can only dream.  The popularly and 
financially successful author, with her even more successful television 
                                                
12 “Critics and utopian authors [seem to believe] that after witnessing the horrors of world wars and 
tragically failed attempts by Hitler and Stalin to impose utopian blueprints, and after reading the powerful 
dystopian visions of Zamiatin, Huxley, and Orwell—late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century readers 
cannot and will not believe that humans can create perfect worlds or that writers are capable of envisioning 
a perfection that would appeal to many more than one reader, the author.  The (modern) classic expression 
of this assumed skeptical reader is the voice of Le Guin’s narrator in ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from 
Omelas.’  She repeatedly questions the reader’s ability to accept the possibility of a better world (‘Do you 
believe? . . . No? Then . . .’); admits her inability to articulate such a world (‘How can I tell you about the 
people of Omelas?’); and [explicitly] gives readers freedom to imagine their own Omelas, since she knows 
her words will never satisfy the readers” (Roemer 62).  “All She Wrote” engages in a similarly apologetic 
direct address of the skeptical utopian reader. 
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advocate, provides the final interruption “preventing” the production of the 
book in our hands.   
And yet Oprah Winfrey makes a telling funhouse reflection for 
Harryette Mullen:  both of these black Southern women have succeeded in 
creating racially integrated audiences for their cultural productions; their 
cross-media television-literature projects might be seen as roughly 
symmetrical; both promote democratic access to literature.  If Winfrey 
corresponds to the Kenya Dunston character in Percival Everett’s Erasure, 
Mullen (at least superficially) much more closely resembles Monk Ellison:  of 
limited fame and only middle-class means, but highly educated, 
sophisticated, highbrow, avant-garde.  Whereas Monk’s deadly earnestness, 
his partial capitulation to complicity with forces he despises, and the highly 
ironically charged distance he maintains between himself and all of his 
cultural productions—from his paper on S/Z to his novel Fuck—leave him 
mortally fragmented by the end of Everett’s novel, Mullen’s pre-wounded 
book maintains a sense of control and good humor throughout via its 
gamelike persistence in rearranging fragments of autobiography, high and 
mass culture in versatile (or equivocal) patterns that can be shored up against 
culture’s ruin or against its hegemonic dominion equally.  It is precisely in 
her avant-garde word-nerd games that Mullen locates a resiliently perverse 
silliness13—precisely her highly educated “monumental / music made of 
syllables” that she aligns with the outsider artist’s “heartbroken crystal / 
cathedral with gleaming walls / of Orangina bottles” (“Outside Art,” page 
56)—precisely from the Oulipo, an obscure French apex of erudition, that 
                                                
13 I can’t help but contrast Mullen with sober, responsible fellow word nerd MacNolia Cox (in A Van 
Jordan’s book of poems, MacNolia).  Could a sense of the absurd have eased MacNolia’s troubled 
relationships with education, work, and her husband?  Or is it Mullen’s privileged position relative to 
MacNolia that allows her the luxury of silliness? 
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she derives her poems’ childish ability to expose and confound power 
structures by using language orthogonally to workaday utilitarian aims.  
Sleeping with the Dictionary represents an extreme version of one of 
poetry’s central projects:  opening a space of imaginative liberty, available 
equally for beauty and babble, by refusing linguistic instrumentalism and 
thus placing its pages, according to the language-poetry view of such matters, 
outside the economic sphere.14  
In his essay “The Burden of Culture,” Jonathan Sterne boils down the 
question of poetry’s function—of instrumentalism versus functionless 
pleasure—to a question of the uses of leisure time.  
 
Where the culture industry looks to each possible text or 
practice as a means of revenue generation, cultural studies 
considers each text or practice in terms of its possible and 
actual political uses. . . .  leisure time is political capital. In a 
strange way, both the political economists and populists have 
mirrored the very capitalist logic they seek to criticize. . . . We 
must let go of the idea that all cultural practices can or should 
be converted to politically productive labor. Otherwise, we are 
not better than ratings companies like Arbitron.       82, 97 
 
 
Are we convinced by Sterne’s insistence that “a humane society would allow 
for meaningless, nondirected activity that nonetheless uses human energy, 
                                                
14 Of course, the language-poetry view that noninstrumental language is untainted by the commercial 
sphere overlooks that fact that books of poetry are available for sale—this one handsomely printed by a 
prestigious and financially stable university press—and provide poets with publication credit important to 
their own economic stability. 
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effort and creativity”?  If “the alternative is to put our subjects to work day 
in and day out, which leaves them to a rather dim social fate” (99), then Bob 
Holman’s pro-instrumentalist question, “if the poem were to become [an 
actual tool for building a new society], wouldn’t this obviate its imaginative 
power, its anti-utilitarian purpose as the site where one can go to get away 
from the world’s madness?” starts to sound counterproductive.  What kind 
of utopia offers to relieve us of the burdensome necessity of imaginative play 
(as if escapism were such play’s only motivation)?  But the power of Mullen’s 
poetry is that it works politically and plays at the same time—that it models a 
style of critical and creative thought that in its very disruption of meaning 
embodies both gestural delight and activism.  Just as the Oulipian method 
Mullen shares with Bök turns poetic reading practice on its head to produce 
signifier-play as necessity and signification as exciting excess, so the poems 
in this volume are so babblingly playful that their grave political implications 
become necessary to the pleasure of the poems’ games.   
 Moral gravity’s necessity to Sleeping with the Dictionary’s pleasure 
becomes particularly clear in the case of the few poems whose lack of 
political import leaves them to fizzle, too slight to carry their weight.  For 
instance, the titular “Sleeping with the Dictionary”  (67) may paradoxically 
appear as one of the book’s less interesting poems—perhaps because, for all 
its clever local puns, the poem’s conceit (an erotic, oneiric encounter with 
language as antidote to insomnia) never moves beyond the title—or perhaps 
because the poem remains in the bedroom rather than spreading beyond the 
private, traditionally lyric first-person descriptive mode to connect its 
personal meditation with the larger political questions that lend force and 
consequence to so many of Mullen’s playful experiments. 
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 Other poems whose agenda does not push as far beyond play and the 
personal sphere include Mullen’s three poems for her family—“Ask Aden” 
(8) and “O, ‘Tis William” (54) for her nephews and “Kirstenography” (46-7) 
for her sister.  The former two are certainly fun tributes to children, playing 
on the boys’ names, but are these games fascinating enough to hold the 
interest of readers not named Aden or William Otis?  The poems’ invitation 
can be extended if readers imagine the poems as prompting us to play similar 
games with our own loved ones’ names.  Ultimately, though, these games 
lack the excess of moral weight or public import that invigorates the book’s 
better poems.  “Kirstenography,” a biography of Mullen’s sister Kirsten, at 
first glance appears to be complete nonsense:  “K was burn at the bend of 
the ear in the mouth of Remember. She was the fecund chill burn in her 
famish.”  But reading the poem aloud reveals it to be an exercise in 
homophonic substitution:  “K was born at the end of the year in the month 
of December.  She was the second child born in her family.”  The poem’s 
homophonic structure draws attention to sound, to the similarities between 
and among signifiers signifying entirely different concepts; it invites the 
reader to piece together the elements that have been replaced by 
homophones in order to make sense of the story of Kristin’s life. 
 However, the task of re-translating is a finite one, offering limited 
rewards:  though local pleasures swirl around particular irreverent 
substitutions (“per rental doodly” for “parental duty,” “reckoned comics” 
for “economics,” “Cutie Ostentatious” for “UT Austin, Texas”), the life 
story that emerges strikes a well-educated middle-class reader as happy, 
certainly, but also eminently ordinary—K is born, grows up in a loving, 
education-valuing household, excels in school, finds a congenial job, marries, 
divorces, remarries, has two children, and lives happily ever after (“loved 
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shapely over laughter”).  Once the poem is re-translated, the joke is spent; 
the poem has limited re-read and meditation value.  At a stretch, the poem’s 
political value might lie within the very ordinary happiness of this story of a 
black girl raised by a divorced mother and yet firmly in possession, by the 
end, of the prizes mainstream American life offers:  the well-educated and 
happily married Kirsten might represent a corrective to the dearth of 
published stories, lamented by Zora Neale Hurston in her 1950 essay “What 
White Publishers Won’t Print,” “about the internal lives and emotions of . . . 
non-Anglo-Saxon peoples within our borders, above the class of unskilled 
labor” (117) or the “insistence on defeat in a story where upperclass Negroes 
are portrayed” (120).  The veiling of Kirsten’s story in a playful homophonic 
code might gesture towards white audiences’ traditional reluctance to hear 
such a story.  But such a reading demands more internal tension, more of 
Kirsten’s inner experience, than the poem provides.  “Kirstenography” 
appears similar to the opening of Ron Silliman’s Tjanting: fun, but in no way 
radical. 
 I offer these counterexamples to help focus my account of what 
Sleeping with the Dictionary does offer in most of its poems:  an approach 
to poetry that draws attention to convergences between the techniques of 
the American avant-garde—an avant-garde that Silliman’s “Poetry and the 
Politics of the Subject” seems to identify as white—and traditional African-
American modes of expression.  In Producing American Races, Patricia 
McKee traces how Toni Morrison’s characters “enter into exchanges in 
which referents”—that is, signifieds—“are suspect.  Any image or word, 
then, calls for a critical response . . . What becomes critical to black identity 
is . . . how people respond to one another” (192).  Harryette Mullen’s poems 
respond to their cultural environment by sending out renewed calls.  They 
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reveal difficulties of language—both inherent linguistic problems and the 
cynical snarls of corporate Orwellianism—which make language a precarious 
(yet beautiful) medium in which to build coalitions and mount political 
critique.  Her quotational and citational choices evoke not just synecdoche 
and wounding, but also recycling and composting—projects in which 
disposable rubbish is re-crafted to nourish and delight; her inclusive, wide-
angled cut-and-paste aesthetic method does not allow for reductive analyses.  
Sleeping with the Dictionary never reduces race in America to a black/white 
binary, for instance, but instead embeds questions of identity (gendered and 
sexual identities that come in black, white, yellow, red, and brown) in a larger 
discourse about languages, economics, power, and the nation.  Mullen’s 
poetry includes but transcends—transcends by including—criticism and 
propaganda, reveling in the artistic excess that creates space for beauty and 
pleasure.  That excessive space—that utopian noplace—is the place Mullen 
has set for reader-guests from a wide variety of discursive backgrounds; she 
invites us in to make it someplace together. 
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